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ABSTRACT 
 Since the turn of the 21st century, China has steadily expanded security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia, reflected in more frequent naval port calls and military 
exercises and in increased arms sales to states in the region. Why has China been 
pursuing closer security cooperation in Southeast Asia, and what factors influence the 
degree to which Southeast Asian states seek, accept, or reject security cooperation with 
China? This thesis finds that China is primarily motivated to improve security ties in 
Southeast Asia in order to establish regional preeminence and cement its status as a great 
power. Related and supporting Chinese objectives include using security cooperation to 
achieve the following: establish influence within key Southeast Asian states that can be 
wielded to serve Chinese interests, prevent encirclement by the United States or its allies, 
and assuage regional anxieties about perceived Chinese aggressiveness. This thesis also 
finds that factors influencing the degree to which Southeast Asian states seek, accept, or 
reject security cooperation with China include the level of U.S. security cooperation a 
state receives, an interest in diversification of security partnerships, the prevalence of 
illiberalism or human rights abuses, and the presence or absence of a territorial dispute 
with China. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION AND MAIN FINDINGS 
China’s strategic interests are arguably greater in Southeast Asia than in any other 
region of the world.1 It is no surprise then that the array of tools that China employs in its 
engagements with Southeast Asian countries is wide-ranging and diverse, to include formal 
diplomatic exchanges, economic investment and aid, cultural outreach, and security 
cooperation.2 The focus of this thesis will be on this last instrument, which China has 
increasingly applied in recent years as a key element of its wider diplomatic and 
geopolitical strategy for the region.3 Since the turn of the 21st century, security cooperation 
between China and Southeast Asia has deepened markedly, evidenced by the growing 
visibility and frequency of bilateral and multilateral exercises, naval port calls, and arms 
sales, and various other forms of military engagement.4  
This thesis tries to explain this development, specifically posing the following 
primary question: why has security cooperation between China and Southeast Asia been 
increasing since the turn of the 21st century? Furthermore, in order to evaluate both sides 
of the phenomenon, the following sub-questions are addressed:  
1. Why is China pursuing closer security cooperation with states in Southeast 
Asia? 
                                                 
 1 Eric Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” in China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major Power 
Engagement with the Developing World, ed. Joshua Eisenman and Eric Heginbotham, (New York: 
Routledge, 2018), 50. 
2 Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” 57. 
3 Evan A. Laksmana, “Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8, no. 3 (October 2012): 251, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2012.723920. 
4 Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: 




2. What factors influence the degree to which Southeast Asian states seek, 
accept, or reject Chinese security cooperation?   
On the Chinese side of the equation, this thesis finds that China’s primary 
motivation for deepening its security ties in Southeast Asia is to establish regional 
preeminence and cement its status as a great power. While security cooperation is not the 
only means with which China is striving achieve this end, it is a key tool. Related and 
supporting Chinese objectives include using security cooperation to achieve the following: 
to establish influence within key Southeast Asian states that can be leveraged to serve 
Chinese interests, to prevent encirclement by the United States or its allies in the region, 
and to assuage regional anxieties about perceived Chinese aggressive intent. On the 
Southeast Asian side of the equation, this thesis finds that factors influencing the degree to 
which Southeast Asian states seek, accept, or reject security cooperation with China 
include the level of U.S. security cooperation a state receives, an interest in diversification 
of security partnerships, the prevalence of illiberalism or human rights abuses, and the 
presence or absence of a territorial dispute with China. More specifically, Southeast Asian 
states that experience a decreased level of U.S. security cooperation, that prioritize 
diversification of security partnerships, and that have a pattern of illiberalism or human 
rights abuses tend to seek or accept more security cooperation with China than states in 
which these factors are not active. However, states that have a territorial dispute with China 
tend to reject significant security cooperation with China, or at least conduct it to a lesser 
extent than states without a territorial dispute, even if all of these other factors are active.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
China’s heightened engagement in the field of security cooperation is one key 
element of the country’s continued rise, both in terms of its military capability and reach 
as well as its influence in the region more broadly. As it persists in cultivating closer 
security relationships across Southeast Asia, China will not only be able to further hone its 
military’s operational capabilities through more frequent and complex exercises; it will 
also likely be able to bolster its rapport with states in the region more generally, 
conceivably leveraging improved relations in certain countries to gain access in the future 
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to key airfields, ports, or other strategic locations.5 If such a potentiality were to occur, 
China’s improved military positioning in Southeast Asia could better enable it to challenge 
the United States and its allies if China were to one day adopt a more aggressive posture, 
for example in the event of a Taiwan contingency.6 Furthermore, there are implications 
beyond the military realm. As Chinese security relationships in the region strengthen, 
China could extend the influence gained therefrom to support non-military objectives, 
including attempting to use its growing regional sway to modify existing norms in a way 
that is more conducive to Chinese interests rather than U.S. interests.7 
An examination of the topic raised in this thesis is relevant to U.S. interests in 
additional ways beyond the considerations enumerated in the preceding paragraph. 
Southeast Asia is strategically important to the United States. Thailand and the Philippines 
are American treaty allies, and the United States also has security relationships at varying, 
though lesser, degrees of maturity with other nations in the region. Consequently, it is in 
the U.S. interest to understand the current scope of Chinese relationships in Southeast Asia 
and to ensure that those relationships do not grow at the expense of existing U.S. ties.8 
While the United States remains the “security partner of choice” for many countries in the 
region, this cannot be taken for granted.9 Persistent effort will be required in order to retain 
this status into the future, particularly in light of the concerted Chinese drive to gain greater 
relevance in the security realm.10 Among other considerations, regional states will 
incorporate the perceived level of U.S. commitment in their calculus regarding how to react 
                                                 
5 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” 60. 
6 Bruce Vaughn and Wayne M. Morrison, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and 
Implications for the United States, CRS Report No. RL32688 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2006), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32688.pdf. 
7 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” 60. 
8 Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” 73. 
9 Evan S. Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East 
Asia to China’s Rise, MG-736-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 
https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG736.html. 
10 Medeiros et al., Pacific Currents: The Responses of U.S. Allies and Security Partners in East Asia 
to China’s Rise, xxiv. 
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to China. They may lean closer to China if the United States recedes or becomes 
comparatively lukewarm in its security engagement.11  
Finally, this topic is significant because Sino-Southeast Asian security relationships 
are likely to continue to expand in the near term.12 Consequently, this development will 
only grow in relevance and significance over the next decade, particularly as competition 
between the United States and China intensifies.13 Understanding what is driving the 
development on the Chinese side and the Southeast Asian side of the equation will better 
enable the United States to position itself to stay ahead of the trajectory and retain its hard-
earned influence in the region. Furthermore, understanding what is driving Chinese 
security policy in Southeast Asia may be instructive in predicting future policy maneuvers 
if and when China’s reach expands elsewhere. Due to the strategic importance of the region 
to China, growing trends in Chinese foreign policy are visible in this area of the world first 
before they manifest in other areas.14  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This literature review is divided into three sections. The first section establishes 
that security cooperation between China and Southeast Asia has been increasing from the 
period of 2000 to 2017. Section two examines increased security cooperation from the 
Chinese perspective and offers leading assessments on why China has been actively 
pursuing closer security relationships, specifically by identifying what objectives China is 
seeking to accomplish. Section three of the literature review considers the Southeast Asian 
perspective, providing prominent assessments of the key factors that influence the degree 
to which states in the region to seek, accept, or reject closer security cooperation with 
China.  
                                                 
11 Vaughn and Morrison, China-Southeast Asia Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the 
United States, 35. 
12 Li, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 38, no. 3 (March 2015): 365, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2014.1002910, 365. 
13 Ian Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” Asian Security 8, no. 3 
(October 2012): 307, https://doi.org/10.1080/14799855.2012.723928. 
14 Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” 47. 
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1. Deepening Security Cooperation between China and Southeast Asia 
In order to address the research question raised in this thesis, it is first imperative 
to establish that security relationships between China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia 
have in fact deepened in recent years. First, regarding definitions, the term security 
cooperation is understood to encompass a wide range of activities: formal defense 
agreements, visits among senior defense officials, military training exchanges, bilateral or 
multilateral military exercises, naval port calls, and arms sales or military aid.15 The term 
defense diplomacy is more commonly used to describe these activities in Southeast Asia, 
and the term military diplomacy is more common in China.16 Second, regarding the 
timeframe examined, this thesis will examine the trajectory of Sino-Southeast Asian 
security cooperation from 2000 to 2017. The early 2000s mark the key timeframe in which 
modern Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation began to expand, and 2017 represents 
the last full calendar year for which data is expected to be available prior to publication. 
Last, the region of Southeast Asia is understood to include the following eleven countries: 
Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, 
East Timor, and the Philippines. 
There is wide consensus that security cooperation between China and Southeast 
Asia has been steadily deepening. This development is generally marked as having begun 
in the early 2000s.17 During this time period, China negotiated multiple bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and began regular exchanges among senior defense officials in 
order to facilitate further security cooperation going forward.18 By the year 2000, China 
signed bilateral joint declarations with eight Southeast Asian states, indicating an intent to 
                                                 
15 Laksmana, “Regional Order by Other Means? Examining the Rise of Defense Diplomacy in 
Southeast Asia,” 253–254. 
16 Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” 290. 
17 Ibid, 287. 
18 Ibid, 292. 
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increase security contact.19 In 2001, China created its first bilateral Defense and Security 
Consultation (DSC) or Defense Policy Dialogue (DPD) with Thailand and established 
those mechanisms with five additional Southeast Asian countries by 2012.20 At the 
multilateral level, China became a proactive participant in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) in 2000, issued Joint Declarations on security related matters in 2002 and 2003, and 
established the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus in 2010.21 Another tool helping 
to create more opportunities for cooperation has been exchanges among senior defense 
officials. China has deployed defense attachés to all ten ASEAN countries and has been 
holding annual defense consultations with six ASEAN countries to discuss opportunities 
for further security cooperation.22 
These mechanisms have enabled China to increase security dialogue and 
cooperation with Southeast Asian states, paving the way for more military exercise 
activities, naval port calls, and arms sales in the region since the early 2000s. In 2005, 
China conducted its first military exercise in the region, a single bilateral exercise with one 
Southeast Asian country, Thailand.23 That same year, China conducted only one naval port 
call to the region, and its exported arms to the region were only estimated at 34 million 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) trend-indicator value (TIV).24 
Looking at more recent activity reveals a clear elevation in the level of security cooperation 
activity. In 2017, China participated in three bilateral exercises with three different 
Southeast Asian countries and in six multilateral exercises in which ten Southeast Asian 
                                                 
19 Gudrun Wacker, Security Cooperation in East Asia, ISSN 1863–1053 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2015), https://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publication/security-cooperation-in-east-asia/. 
20 Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” 68. 
21 Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” 291–292. 
22 Ibid, 296–297. 
23 Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” 68. 
24 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” 
attachment and SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (object name TIV-Export-CHI-2000-2017; accessed 
January 21, 2019), http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php. 
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countries were also participants or observers.25 That same year, China conducted eleven 
port calls to eight different Southeast Asian states, and its exported arms to the region were 
valued at 230 million SIPRI TIV.26  
These trends, which will be examined in greater detail in subsequent chapters, not 
only indicate an increase in Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation but also 
demonstrate that Southeast Asia has become China’s priority region for expanding its 
defense relationships. The majority of China’s security overtures in Asia has been directed 
at Southeast Asian countries. More specifically, approximately 54% of China’s recent 
security cooperation activities have been concentrated among Southeast Asian and Oceanic 
countries for the period of 2000–2016.27 For comparison, the next most prominent region 
of focus, South Asia, is far behind, representing only 21% of Chinese security interactions 
in Asia.28 China’s designation of Southeast Asia as a priority region for security 
cooperation, in combination with a clear pattern of deepening security interactions in over 
the past several years, suggests that the trend will only continue into the future.  
                                                 
25 Allen, Saunders, and Chen, “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” 
attachment and Davis, “China holds first joint exercise with Myanmar Navy” and Defenseworld.net, “US-
Thai Military Exercise To Have Participation From China” and Ministry of Defense Sri Lanka, “‘Exercise -
Cormorant Strike VIII 2017’ begins” and Montsame News Agency, “‘Khaan Quest – 2017’ assembles 
troops from 26 nations” and National Archives of Singapore, “Ex COORES 2017” and Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the 
People’s Republic of China 2017 and Open Source Enterprise, “Japanese Report: Singaporean Navy 
Frigate Docks in China To Engage in Military Exercises” and Open Source Enterprise, “Singapore Frigates 
Lead Multinational Group Sails for International Maritime Review” and Open Source Enterprise, 
“Singapore: ‘Militaries From 18 Nations in Disaster Relief Exercise’” and Pakistan Today, “Multinational 
naval exercise AMAN 2017 to start from tomorrow.” 
26 SIPRI Arms Transfers Database and China Military Online, “China, Brunei hold joint naval drill” 
and Davis, “China holds first joint exercise with Myanmar Navy” and Embassy of the People’s Republic of 
China in the Kingdom of Thailand, “Chinese Naval Fleet Arrived in Thailand for Visit” and Huang, 
“Chinese hospital ship Peace Ark visits Timor-Leste” and Open Source Enterprise, “Cambodia: PRC’s East 
Sea Fleet Arrives in Sihanoukville Port for Goodwill Visit 30 Sep-3 Oct 2017” and Open Source 
Enterprise, “Malaysia: Foreign Minister Says Chinese Warship Docking Not Sign of ‘Quasi-Alliance’ With 
China” and Open Source Enterprise, “Southeast Asia Snapshot 5 May 2017” and Page and Watts, “Chinese 
Submarine’s Malaysian Port Call Signals Regional Power Shift.” 




2. Chinese Objectives for Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia 
Across an array of primary sources released over the past two decades, China has 
consistently identified regional security cooperation as a strategic priority. The emphasis 
on regional security cooperation in its modern form was first elevated as part of the “new 
security concept” introduced in the late 1990s.29 Since that time, it has been consistently 
stressed in white papers or when Chinese defense officials have made public remarks on 
the subject of security. For example, in a white paper on China’s national defense in 2010, 
China specifically highlighted the building of “cooperative military relations” and the 
holding of “military exchanges and cooperation” with neighboring countries as among the 
“goals and tasks of China’s national defense.”30 The same document also identified “joint 
military exercises and training with other countries” as a demonstration of China’s security 
role in the region and the world, specifically mentioning joint maritime exercises with 
Thailand, Singapore, and Vietnam. In China’s most recent white paper on military strategy, 
published in 2015, a spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense again emphasized 
regional security cooperation explicitly, stating an intent to “actively expand military and 
security cooperation” and “deepen military relations” with neighboring countries.31  
It is not just the defense community in China that is underscoring the importance 
of regional defense relationships. In a white paper published by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs in 2017, China called for intensifying military cooperation in the Asia-Pacific 
region.32 Specifically, China emphasized the need for the development of a regional 
multilateral security framework and highlighted the centrality of ASEAN with regard to 
inculcating closer regional cooperation. China delineated each of its current engagement 
mechanisms with ASEAN states, including the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ARF, and the 
                                                 
29 Heginbotham, “China’s Strategy in Southeast Asia,” 67. 
30 “China’s National Defense in 2010,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of 
China, March 31, 2011, http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7114675.htm. 
31 “China’s Military Strategy,” State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
May 2015, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Press/2015-05/26/content_4586805.htm. 
32 “China’s Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, January 11, 2017, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1429771.shtml. 
 9 
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus), and advocated for using each 
mechanism to further deepen security cooperation. Separately, in remarks after the China-
ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting, Foreign Minister Wang Yi emphasized that improving 
security relationships with ASEAN states would continue to be a priority moving forward, 
stating that security cooperation “will be elevated to a higher level” and that the “two sides 
will further expand defense exchange and security affairs cooperation.”33 
There is large degree of consensus on China’s overall strategic goal in Southeast 
Asia. China’s primary objective is to establish regional preeminence and thereby contribute 
to cementing its status as a great power.34 In addition, a review of relevant sources has 
identified some supporting goals that aid this primary purpose. These include establishing 
influence within key Southeast Asian states that can be wielded to serve Chinese interests, 
preventing encirclement by the United States or its allies, and assuaging regional anxieties 
about perceived Chinese aggressive intent. It should be noted that these objectives are 
interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Additionally, it should also be acknowledged that 
security cooperation is not the sole means to achieve these objectives. However, the 
deepening of security ties in Southeast Asia is crucial for China because a dearth of such 
relationships would be an obstacle to the achievement of its enumerated goals in the 
region.35 
Chief among China’s aspirations is to become the most influential country in 
Southeast Asia and to achieve the “Chinese Dream,” as elucidated by President Xi Jinping 
in 2012, of re-attaining the country’s former greatness as a premier power.36 Attaining this 
                                                 
33 Wang Yi, “Wang Yi’s Remarks on the Biggest Highlight and Deliverable of the China-ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers’ Meeting,” August 3, 2018, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1582742.shtml. 
34 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, 2017), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Report.PDF. 
35 Li, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia,” 379. 
36 Li, “The People’s Liberation Army and China’s Smart Power Quandary in Southeast Asia,” 362 
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dream by gaining regional preeminence and great power status will require China to 
nourish and leverage its growing strength, including its rapidly developing military.37 
Security cooperation with states in Southeast Asia directly contributes to this endeavor. 
Military exchanges and exercises with states in the region provide China with the 
opportunity to build confidence in their military strength and increase operational 
experience and proficiency.38 Furthermore, they offer China a platform to “demonstrate 
our fine image on the international stage.”39 By showcasing its emergent capabilities during 
various regional engagements, China is able to contribute to its desired international image 
as a great power with the requisite military might to match.40 China is also contributing to 
its desired image as a great power by taking a leading role in the effort to build regional 
security relationships and by showing a willingness to take on a greater level of 
responsibility. China is demonstrating its awareness that, as the dominant rising power in 
the region, it should shoulder “greater responsibilities for regional and global security” and 
provide “more public security services to the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.”41 
Among China’s other objectives is to gain greater influence in certain Southeast 
Asian countries that can then be exerted to serve China’s wider policy goals. China has 
been able to use security cooperation as one of its tools towards achieving this end.42 
Southeast Asian states in which China has made the most progress in advancing defense 
relationships to establish influence include Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand.43 For 
example, since extending military aid and other support to Cambodia, the country has 
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supported China on a number of issues, even blocking ASEAN’s adoption of statements 
deemed inimical to China’s interests.44 China has also made a concerted effort to use 
security cooperation to establish stronger relations with other states, particularly the largest 
and most influential states in Southeast Asia.45 Notably, China has only established DSCs 
or DPDs with Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia, not with smaller or 
less prominent states like Cambodia and Myanmar, demonstrating a preference based on 
the size of the state and the amount of influence it wields in the region.46 
Additionally, China wants to prevent Southeast Asian states aligned with the United 
States from encircling China and countering its growing prominence. Preventing American 
preeminence in Southeast Asia is one of China’s central priorities in the region.47 Security 
cooperation is one of the means that China has employed towards accomplishing this 
objective. Since the early 2000s, China has used security cooperation to exploit potential 
rifts in U.S. defense partnerships, seeking opportunities to bolster its own security 
relationships and even supplant American ones.48 For example, when Philippine relations 
with the U.S. temporarily soured in 2004 and Thailand experienced a suspension of 
American military assistance in 2006, China quickly stepped in to offer military aid to both 
countries.49 Additionally, in order to help prevent alignment among Southeast Asian states 
themselves, China uses diplomatic efforts, including security cooperation, to establish 
closer ties with certain states, thereby making it more difficult for the region to unite and 
form an anti-China bloc.50 
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49 Ibid. 
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Lastly, China also aspires to form closer security relationships with Southeast Asian 
neighbors in order to reinforce its desired narrative of a peaceful rise and to assuage 
perceptions of its aggressiveness, which could otherwise lead states to act to contain it. 
Chinese policy makers are aware that some Southeast Asian leaders feel threatened by 
China’s growing military strength.51 They seek to counteract this impression by inculcating 
an image of China as a “security partner” and “security provider” rather than a security 
threat.52 Military engagements are a good way to contribute to this image. They enable 
China to improve mutual trust and deepen cooperation.53 Military exercises generate good 
will, with multilateral exercises being the most useful as they provide a wider audience for 
whom to demonstrate peaceful intent.54 Positive military relationships strengthen China’s 
narrative that its growing military power is a net gain for the region because it enables 
China to contribute to regional and global security and peace.55  
3. Factors Influencing Southeast Asian Receptiveness to Chinese 
Security Cooperation  
A review of a variety of relevant sources demonstrates that there are multiple 
factors, both at the systemic and domestic levels, that influence the degree to which 
Southeast Asian countries conduct security cooperation with China. At the systemic level, 
there is wide consensus that a central factor influencing a state’s propensity to seek, accept, 
or reject closer security cooperation with China stems from the changing power dynamics 
in the region and the accompanying pressures placed on countries therein. The rise of 
another great power in the region and vacillating levels of U.S. engagement influences the 
degree to which Southeast Asian states choose to conduct security cooperation with China. 
In addition, a review of key sources indicates that there are also number of factors at play 
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at the unit level that influence the degree to which Southeast Asian states conduct security 
cooperation with China, to include: the presence or absence of an ongoing territorial 
dispute with China and the occurrence of major domestic political transitions, specifically 
when they are accompanied by a significant degree of illiberalism or human rights abuses. 
In the face of changing great power dynamics in the region caused by the rise of 
China, Southeast Asian states are under pressure to either bandwagon with China, hedge 
between China and the United States, or balance against China. Virtually all Southeast 
Asian states are electing the hedging option.56 The calculus driving this strategy is 
multifaceted. Southeast Asian states are seeking to maintain relationships with both China 
and the United States because doing so increases the range of support available; it enables 
them to solicit benefits from two major powers as opposed to just one.57 Additionally, most 
Southeast Asian states are seeking to maintain an equilibrium among their foreign 
partnerships in order to ensure that they do not become too dependent on one major 
power.58 Dependence on one major power can have drawbacks. Southeast Asian states that 
align heavily with one partner are at greater risk of being dominated by an external power 
that could intimidate them into taking actions that run counter to their own sovereign 
interests.59  
This hedging approach and reticence to rely too heavily on a single foreign power 
is evident across the region among both mainland and maritime Southeast Asian states.60 
For example, both Thailand and the Philippines have implemented this strategy, though to 
varying degrees. Thailand has become China’s closest partner in Southeast Asia on the 
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60 Dalpino, “The U.S.-Thailand Alliance: Continuity and Change in the 21st Century,” 158. 
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mainland while also maintaining its primary military relationship with the United States.61 
Though it remains an American treaty ally and regularly conducts major bilateral exercises 
with U.S. forces, Thailand has been conducting joint exercises with China since 2005, has 
signed multiple agreements with China to increase defense cooperation, and has elected to 
purchase a substantial amount of arms from China, including advanced equipment like 
Main Battle Tanks (MBT) and Yuan submarines.62  
While the Philippine strategy has changed over time, a similar hedging dynamic is 
emerging in the Philippines. President Duterte seems to be seeking a middle ground 
between his predecessors’ approaches, opting for neither President Macapagal-Arroyo’s 
open deference for China nor President Aquino’s open defiance for China and preference 
for the United States.63 While the Philippines remains an American treaty ally, and the 
United States remains a significantly larger defense partner than China, Duterte has 
canceled or reduced in scope several exercises with the United States.64 Simultaneously, 
he has acquired Chinese-made weapons for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), 
and he has suggested that the Philippines and China should consider conducting joint 
military exercises.65  
Relatedly, the level of perceived U.S. commitment and engagement in the region 
can also influence how states choose to interact with China. Due to the prevalence of 
hedging in the region, one would expect to see Southeast Asian states seek to improve their 
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security relationship with China during periods when they are cooperating more closely 
with the United States. Conversely, one would expect to see Southeast Asian states pull 
back on their security relationship with China during periods when their relations with the 
United States diminish. This approach would enable Southeast Asian states to maintain the 
desired equilibrium between the great powers in the region and not allow one power to 
become too dominant. However, this is not always the pattern that manifests. In some 
cases, there is an inverse as opposed to a direct correlation between Southeast Asian states’ 
security relations with the United States and China. 
During periods in which Southeast Asian states’ security relationship with the 
United States weakened, or when they perceived U.S. commitment to the region to be 
waning, some states sought or accepted warmer security relations with China. For example, 
in 2004, during the post-9/11 period in which counter-terrorism became the top U.S. 
security priority, the Philippine relationship with the United States became strained.66 
Simultaneously, the Macapagal-Arroyo administration in the Philippines began to succumb 
to the Chinese charm offensive, entertaining Chinese offers to donate millions of dollars’ 
worth of equipment to the AFP and to conduct bilateral training.67 More recently, after the 
election of President Duterte in 2016, the Philippines began to re-orient away from the 
United States and towards China due in part to the new president’s lack of confidence in 
the U.S. commitment to his country’s defense.68 In Cambodia and Thailand, both countries 
expanded their security relationship with China in the aftermath of a withdrawal of U.S. 
defense support.69 Additional factors were at play in these latter incidents, as will be 
discussed later in this section, but they also demonstrate a dynamic in which a deterioration 
of the U.S. security relationship was accompanied simultaneously by an improvement in 
the Chinese security relationship.  
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While the systemic pressures accompanying China’s rise and changing great power 
dynamics are strong, it should be noted that they do not influence all Southeast Asian states 
equally. While most states are hedging, there are certain states in Southeast Asia, like 
Cambodia or Myanmar, that are responding to changing systemic dynamics differently. 
These states are choosing to maintain closer relations with China rather than to hedge.70 In 
order to understand why Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation varies significantly in 
intensity across countries despite the entire region witnessing the same change in systemic 
power dynamics, it is crucial to also consider unit-level factors in determining a state’s 
likelihood to seek, accept, or reject Chinese security cooperation.71  
Firstly, major domestic political changes, such as regime changes or leadership 
transitions, influence Southeast Asian states’ level of security cooperation with China. 
Political transitions do not always result in warmer security relations with China, so they 
cannot be considered causal in and of themselves. There must also be certain other 
conditions at play to explain why major domestic political changes are sometimes 
accompanied by an expansion of security cooperation with China and sometimes are not. 
When domestic political shifts in Southeast Asian states are predicated or followed by what 
major Western security partners would consider to be heightened illiberalism or human 
rights abuses, then those shifts are often followed by an increase in security cooperation 
with China. This tends to occur because such abuses limit the availability of support from 
major security partners like the United States and other Western powers. China, in 
comparison, stands out as viable partner when support dries up elsewhere because it does 
not impose the same conditions on its security cooperation.72 
Demonstrations of this phenomenon are evident across the region. For example, 
Myanmar became an “international pariah” in 1990 after the military junta refused to 
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recognize the results of democratic elections in the country.73 Myanmar needed both 
economic and military aid in order to ensure its regime’s survival, but its options were 
limited due to the international condemnation and sanctions its behavior incurred.74 
Looking to its northeastern neighbor, Myanmar had a willing partner in China, which was 
facing similar international isolation after allegations of illiberalism and human rights 
abuses surrounding the Tiananmen Square incident.75 In Cambodia, after a violent coup 
heralded in new leadership in 1997, the country’s security relationship with China 
strengthened.76 China became a reliable alternative to fill any Cambodian defense 
shortfalls after the United States postponed and reduced military cooperation due to 
concerns about human rights abuses associated with the coup.77 Similarly, after a military 
coup in 2014 in Thailand in which the National Council for Peace and Order took over the 
government, the United States reduced military assistance, and the country’s security 
relationship with China became closer.78 In the Philippines, U.S. criticism of human rights 
abuses in the country after the accession of President Duterte in 2016 is one of the central 
factors that damaged the Philippine relationship with the United States.79 The criticism 
contributed to Duterte’s decision to openly express doubt about his country’s defense 
relationship with the United States and to begin accepting new forms of security assistance 
from China.80  
Secondly, the presence or absence of an ongoing territorial dispute between a 
Southeast Asian state and China has also had a significant impact on the degree to which 
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that state will engage in security cooperation with China. Those states that have significant 
territorial disputes with China have tended to be less receptive to Chinese overtures writ 
large, including in the security realm.81 For example, Vietnam and the Philippines have 
major maritime territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea. These disputes have 
served as significant irritants constraining the development of close bilateral relations 
between these Southeast Asian states and China.82 China has not yet conducted bilateral 
exercises with the Philippines or Vietnam, and those countries only started participating in 
multilateral exercises with China in 2014 and 2015, respectively.83 By contrast, Thailand, 
a country with which China has no major territorial disputes, is among China’s closest 
bilateral security partners in Southeast Asia, with Thailand often serving as the first country 
with which China achieves a new security cooperation milestone.84 Cambodia is similarly 
unencumbered by territorial disputes with China, and it is among China’s closest partners 
in Southeast Asia.85 Additionally, China’s largest arms sales customers in Southeast Asia 
are states with which China does not have contested territorial claims in the South China 
Sea: Myanmar, Thailand, and Cambodia.86  
Some may point to the Philippines, particularly since 2016 when President Duterte 
was elected, as having come to represent an exception to the observation that territorial 
disputes tend to slow Southeast Asian security cooperation with China. However, while 
President Duterte has made some clear steps towards China in the defense realm, the 
defense relationship between the two states is still nascent and limited. This is especially 
apparent in comparison with the Sino-Thai defense relationship or in comparison with the 
U.S.-Philippine relationship. Further, the fact that Duterte’s increasing receptiveness to 
engaging China in the field security cooperation started in 2016 only serves to reinforce 
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the observation that defense relationships with Southeast Asian states that have major 
territorial disputes with China tend to develop later than with states that do not have a 
dispute.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis highlights four hypotheses as key explanations for the growth in Sino-
Southeast Asian security cooperation.  
• Hypothesis 1: Decreased security cooperation with the United States 
drives Southeast Asian states to seek or accept greater security cooperation 
with China. 
• Southeast Asian states desiring security cooperation with a strong 
external power turn to China as an alternative means of support 
during periods in which the United States becomes less active or 
reliable as a security partner. This option has become more viable 
for Southeast Asian states in recent years as China has grown in 
military strength and technical capability and has gained a greater 
capacity to engage in security cooperation at a level increasingly 
commensurate with the United States.  
• Hypothesis 2: A desire to minimize their dependence on a single source 
of external security support drives Southeast Asian states to engage in 
greater security cooperation with China. 
• Southeast Asian states are wary of the amount of influence that 
accrues to an external power when they become too dependent on 
that power as the primary purveyor of external security support. 
When one major power has primacy in this way, it is able to wield 
considerable influence on Southeast partner states to the degree 
that their strategic autonomy becomes infringed upon. In order to 
temper the influence that any one power can wield, some Southeast 
Asian states seek to diversify their major defense partners. As 
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mentioned above, China is an increasingly viable option as a 
defense partner due to its growth in military power and capability. 
Consequently, some states are turning to China as an option for 
diversification.  
• Hypothesis 3: Major domestic political changes, specifically changes in 
regime or political leadership, drive Southeast Asian states to seek or 
accept closer security cooperation with China when the transition is 
illiberal and/or accompanied by an increase in human rights abuses. 
• Significant changes in domestic politics have often been followed 
by shifts in the security relationship between Southeast Asian 
states and China. However, this does not always occur. 
Consequently, major changes in domestic politics, specifically 
changes in regime or political leadership, cannot be considered 
causal factors in and of themselves. Domestic political transitions 
are accompanied by an increase in Sino-Southeast Asian security 
cooperation when political illiberalism and human rights abuses 
are apparent. In these cases, Southeast Asian states seek or accept 
security cooperation from China due to an inability to secure 
support from other powers. 
• Hypothesis 4: The presence or absence of major territorial disputes 
between Southeast Asian states and China significantly impacts the degree 
to which Southeast Asian states conduct security cooperation with China.  
• Southeast Asian states with which China has a territorial dispute 
tend to limit their engagement with China in bilateral security 
activities. Consequently, when there is an active territorial dispute 
between China and a Southeast Asian state, security cooperation 
between the countries tends to be lower. Conversely, when there is 
not an active territorial dispute between China and a Southeast 
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Asian state, security cooperation between the countries tends to be 
higher.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The first major portion of this thesis will focus on establishing the range and scope 
of Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation from both the Chinese and Southeast Asian 
sides of the equation. The research design will examine a wide variety of sources, to include 
interviews with subject matter experts, scholarly articles, primary sources from China and 
Southeast Asia, and various other sources of data regarding defense sales, military 
exercises, naval port calls, and other forms of security cooperation. Broadly, these sources 
will be used to assess the overall level of security cooperation between China and various 
Southeast Asian states between 2000 and 2017 and to capture the variance in types of 
security cooperation from one bilateral relationship to another. Additionally, these sources 
will be used to elaborate upon the objectives that China is seeking to accomplish through 
regional security cooperation and to explore the range of actions that China has taken to 
encourage further activity in that realm. Finally, these sources will be used to classify the 
range of Southeast Asian participation across the region and thereby establish a spectrum 
along which countries can be placed, ranging from those that have most actively sought 
Chinese security cooperation and those that have been most reluctant. 
The second major portion of this thesis will focus on examining specific Southeast 
Asian countries and the factors affecting the degree to which they conduct security 
cooperation with China in greater depth. In order to the limit the scope of the project, this 
thesis will not include a programmatic examination of each Southeast Asian country’s 
security relationship with China. Rather, the thesis will use a case study approach, 
examining a representative sample of two countries in the region and identifying what 
factors are most significantly influencing each country’s level of security cooperation with 
China. In order to cover different portions of the spectrum elaborated in the previous 
section of the thesis, the thesis will examine a country in the region that is among the closest 
cooperators with China and a country on the other end of the spectrum that has had much 
more limited and nascent security engagement with China. Respectively, the two countries 
 22 
are Thailand and the Philippines. Thailand and the Philippines are also selected because 
they represent the two countries in Southeast Asia in which the United States’ strategic 
security interest is highest.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be comprised of five chapters. Chapter I introduces the research 
question that the project is attempting to answer, provides necessary background 
information on the subject, specifies hypotheses, and offers an overview of the analysis to 
follow. Chapter II examines the phenomenon of increased security cooperation between 
China and Southeast Asia from the Chinese perspective, analyzing the range and scope of 
Chinese actions to increase security cooperation in the region from 2000 to 2017 and 
elaborating on the objectives China is seeking to accomplish with such activity, as well as 
some of the limitations impeding its progress. Chapter III examines the phenomenon from 
the Southeast Asian perspective, examining the range and scope of Southeast Asian efforts 
to seek, accept, or reject security cooperation during the same time period. Chapter IV will 
examine Thailand and the Philippines in greater depth, utilizing a case study approach to 
identify what factors are influencing each state’s determination regarding the level of 
security cooperation it conducts with China. Chapter V will offer conclusions on the 
subject of Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation and assess implications for the region 
and for U.S. policy. 
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II. SINO-SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COOPERATION: 
THE CHINESE SIDE OF THE EQUATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes increasing Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation during 
the period of 2000–2017 from the Chinese side of the equation, expanding upon concepts 
introduced in the literature review of Chapter I in order to fully address the sub-question: 
Why is China pursuing closer security relationships with states in Southeast Asia? The 
answer to this question is multifold. China has prioritized deepening Sino-Southeast Asian 
security cooperation in order to serve several strategic objectives: to regain regional 
preeminence and establish itself as a great power, to assuage perceptions of its 
aggressiveness, to establish influence in key countries that can be leveraged to serve 
Chinese interests, and to undercut U.S. encirclement and dominance in the region. While 
security cooperation alone cannot achieve these objectives, it is among the key tools that 
China is employing to complement other measures such as economic and diplomatic 
outreach.  
This chapter addresses the sub-question in four subsequent sections. First, it details 
the overall scale of security cooperation that China has conducted in Southeast Asia for the 
period of 2000 to 2017. Second, it elaborates upon the four primary objectives that China 
is seeking to achieve through deeper security cooperation in Southeast Asia, as well 
introduce some secondary objectives. Then, it addresses some of the factors on the Chinese 
side that are limiting China’s rate of progress in developing closer security relationships in 
Southeast Asia.  
B. SCALE OF CHINESE SECURITY COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST 
ASIA 
As indicated in Chapter I, the term security cooperation is understood to encompass 
a wide range of activities: formal defense agreements, visits among senior defense officials, 
military training exchanges, bilateral or multilateral military exercises, naval port calls, and 
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arms sales or military aid.87 While acknowledging this full range of activity is necessary to 
understand the wide breadth of security cooperation activities taking place between China 
and Southeast Asian counterparts, this and subsequent chapters will focus more specifically 
on the most visible and easily quantifiable forms of security cooperation for the sake of 
concision and clarity: naval port visits, bilateral and multilateral exercises, and arms sales. 
This section will present aggregate totals for these activities in order to capture the scale of 
China’s security cooperation activities in Southeast Asia as a whole. Country specific 
breakdowns will be provided in Chapter III in order to demonstrate the range and scope of 
participation among individual Southeast Asian countries.  
The early 2000s are generally marked as the period in which Sino-Southeast Asian 
security cooperation began to steadily grow.88 An examination of the data on total numbers 
of naval port calls, bilateral exercises, multilateral exercises, and arms sales supports this 
generalization, indicating that such activities have been increasing from the early 2000s 
until 2017, with the steepest increase occurring in the past several years. The data also 
indicates that there is a pattern of succession in terms of when new forms of security 
cooperation were introduced and how they increased over time. Chinese naval port calls to 
the region preceded bilateral exercises, and bilateral exercises preceded multilateral 
exercises. Over time, as each of these activities was introduced, their frequency tended to 
increase over subsequent years. Arms sales, while persistent throughout the early 2000s in 
modest levels, underwent a marked increase in recent years, starting in 2011.89 Subsequent 
sections will examine each of these trends, depicted in Figures 1 and 2, in closer detail.  
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The figure above indicates the number of naval port calls, bilateral exercises, and multilateral 
exercises that China has conducted with Southeast Asian countries annually from 2000 to 2017. 
Naval port calls represent incidents in which People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship(s) visited 
a Southeast Asian port of call. Naval port calls accompanied by drills are not also counted separately 
as exercises. Bilateral exercises are exercises between China and one Southeast Asian participant. 
Multilateral exercises are exercises in which China and at least one Southeast Asian state were 
participants or observers in an exercise involving more than two countries. Exercises do not include 
joint patrols or police activities. Data for the years 2000–2016 is sourced from Institute for National 
Strategic Studies’ China Strategic Perspectives publication, and data for the year 2017 is sourced 
from Open Source Enterprise and media reporting.  
Figure 1. Chinese Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 2000–2017: 
Naval Port Calls and Military Exercises90 
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This figure depicts the volume of transfers of major conventional weapons from China to Southeast 
Asia from 2000–2017, reflected in trend-indicator value (TIV), which is based on the unit production 
costs of the transferred weapons. The TIV represents the transfer of military resources, not the sales 
price for the arms sales. SIPRI TIVs are expressed in millions.  
Figure 2. Chinese Arms Exports to Southeast Asia, 2000–201791 
1. Naval Port Calls  
Chinese naval port calls to Southeast Asia have notably increased in annual number 
over the examined period, though the spike to their current level has been slow to develop. 
China averaged only one or two port calls per year between the years 2000 and 2009.92 
However, there has been a marked increase in recent years, starting with the year 2010, 
when China conducted four port calls to four separate Southeast Asian states.93 Although 
the number of port calls dropped again in 2011 and 2012 to two and one, respectively, the 
number surged to a high point of eleven port calls in 2013 to eight different Southeast Asian 
countries.94 Successive years have featured slightly fewer port calls, but the overall trend 
suggests that China has assigned greater priority to conducting this activity in recent years. 
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By 2016, with its visit to East Timor, China had conducted naval port calls to all eleven 
countries in Southeast Asia.95  
Chinese naval port calls to Southeast Asian countries have not just increased in 
frequency over the past several years; they have also increased in variety and complexity. 
All port calls to Southeast Asia for the period of 2000–2009 were considered simple 
“friendly visits.”96 Such visits were primarily diplomatic in purpose and were not 
accompanied by any significant operational interaction between the Chinese and host 
nation navies.97 However, starting in 2010, China began to conduct other activities in 
conjunction with port calls, to include replenishment operations, drills with host nation 
navies, or humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations (HADR).98 Among the 
most visible example of this trend was in 2013, when China conducted its first “harmonious 
mission” in Southeast Asia with its hospital ship, the Peace Ark. That year, the Peace Ark 
conducted HADR operations in conjunction with port calls in four Southeast Asian 
countries.99 While the majority of China’s naval port calls remain friendly, non-operational 
visits that do not include replenishment, drills, or humanitarian operations, China’s overall 
increase in these activities has amplified the benefit that China is able to garner from its 
naval visits in terms of both diplomacy and operational experience.100 
2. Military Exercises  
Since the first Sino-Southeast Asian military exercise in 2005, exercises have 
increased both in terms of overall frequency and in terms of the number of partner 
countries. After its first exercise in 2005, China resumed military exercises in Southeast 
Asia in 2007, conducting one annually from 2007 through 2009 with only two Southeast 
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Asian states.101 Exercise activity increased but remained relatively modest in subsequent 
years until 2014 when China conducted a total of eight military exercises with five 
Southeast Asian partners.102 China would continue to build upon this elevated level of 
activity with eight bilateral or multilateral exercises in 2015, eleven exercises in 2016, and 
nine exercises in 2017.103 In terms of number of partners during those years, China 
participated in exercises with eight different Southeast countries in 2015, nine in 2016, and 
ten in 2017.104 By 2017, China had participated in at least one military exercise, whether 
bilateral or multilateral, with every country in Southeast Asia.105 
Sino-Southeast Asian exercises have not just grown in frequency; they have also 
become increasingly multilateral over time, as opposed to purely bilateral, and they have 
become increasingly complex, involving multiple services and encompassing a wider 
range of military activities. The trend towards more multilateral exercises began in 2013 
when China conducted its first multilateral exercises with Southeast Asian participants, 
specifically ADMM-Plus exercises in the areas of HADR, military medicine, and maritime 
security.106 Since then, China hit a high point of seven multilateral exercises in 2016, and 
in some years has even conducted more multilateral than bilateral exercises 
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overall.107Additionally, China’s military exercises in Southeast Asia initially focused on 
nontraditional security activities as opposed to combat operations.108 From 2005 to 2009, 
and for part of 2010, all bilateral military exercises were in the areas of military operations 
other than war (MOOTW), anti-terrorism, or combat support.109 However, starting in 2010, 
China also began conducting bilateral combat exercises, for example involving airborne 
assault or amphibious assault.110 All of China’s multilateral exercises in Southeast Asia 
have been in nontraditional security operations, not combat operations.111 Further, while 
initial Sino-Southeast Asian exercises involved only a single service, typically the Army 
or the Navy, China has begun to conduct joint operations, albeit to a limited extent. It 
conducted one joint exercise in 2014 and three joint exercises in 2016.112  
3. Arms Sales 
While traditionally being of secondary importance to China, military exports have 
become a progressively more significant element of its overall engagement policy. China 
is increasingly using targeted armed sales to entrench or improve its influence in key 
regions.113 China is among the world’s fastest growing arms exporters. Overall, it has 
increased its exports of major arms by 38 percent from the period of 2008 to 2012 to the 
period of 2013 to 2017, and it has increased its share of global exports from two percent 
during the period of 2003 to 2007 to nearly six percent during the period of 2013 to 2017.114  
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This trend of growing Chinese arms sales is observable in Southeast Asia, 
especially over the past decade, as the region is one of the target markets in which China 
has begun to use defense trade as a tool for deepening relations.115 Chinese exports to 
Southeast Asia have grown markedly in recent years, most notably since 2011.116 In terms 
of quantity, China’s arms exports to Southeast Asia had an average value of 36 million 
SIPRI TIV from 2000 to 2010. However, in the year 2011, the total increased substantially 
to 287 million SIPRI TIV.117 Since then, arms export figures have remained comparably 
elevated, reaching a high point of 368 million SIPRI TIV in 2012.118 It is not just the sheer 
quantity of exports that has increased but also the number of customers in Southeast Asia. 
From 2001 to 2005, China only had one to two customer countries in Southeast Asia each 
year; however, by 2017, China had expanded its customer base significantly, having sold 
arms to at least seven different Southeast Asian countries by the end of that year.119 It 
should be noted that these figures represent only exports of major weapons, not more minor 
weapons and military equipment like small arms, ammunition, support equipment, etc.120 
So, figures including the full range of transferred equipment are likely higher.  
C. CHINESE OBJECTIVES FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN 
SOUTHEAST ASIA 
1. Establish Regional Preeminence and Status as a Great Power 
The first and primary objective that China is serving through pursuing closer 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia is its ambition to regain great power status and 
regional preeminence. In 2012, shortly before becoming the General Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping alluded to these goals when he introduced 
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the “Chinese Dream,” which has come to represent China’s central strategic drive to 
achieve national rejuvenation.121 While President Xi did not explicitly identify great power 
status and regional preeminence as his desired end state for China in this and other 
pronouncements, outside observers have interpreted these two goals to be encapsulated 
within the strategic vision of national rejuvenation.122 The very nature of the word 
“rejuvenation” is clarifying. In a speech in delivered in 2017 at the 19th National Congress 
of the Communist Party of China, President Xi Jinping elaborated on the term’s intended 
meaning. He placed rejuvenation in the context of reviving China’s former glory, directly 
referencing how China had risen over the course of thousands of years to stand firmly 
among the “world’s great nations” before foreign aggressors intervened in the 19th century 
with the first Opium War.123 It should be noted that the period of history that President Xi 
is venerating hearkens back to a world order in which China was not just a great nation; 
China was the central, superior power to which peripheral nations were expected to submit 
and pay tribute.124 The immediate juxtaposition of President Xi’s allusions to a period of 
history in which China was “one of the world’s great nations” and regionally dominant 
with his call for national rejuvenation would seem to indicate that his strategic vision is 
one in which China is once again a great power and regionally preeminent.  
The task of achieving the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation is multifaceted 
and includes a significant focus on economic initiatives; however, a central element of the 
dream is also the development of a powerful military fit for a regionally preeminent great 
power.125 Security cooperation is a vital contributor to this undertaking. Military exercises 
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assist China in “accelerating the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization.”126 
They enable China to increase its military’s confidence and operational proficiency through 
practice and execution of increasingly complex combined operations.127 There are clear 
signs that this strategy is working. As already indicated, China is increasingly conducting 
multilateral exercises. Such exercises are not only more complicated to organize and 
execute, but they also draw larger audiences.128 A preference for more multilateral 
exercises is therefore likely indicative of a Chinese military that is more confident in its 
level of operational proficiency and in its capacity for interoperability, as it is willing to 
showcase itself tackling more complex tasks even under the pressure of international 
scrutiny. The shift towards conducting combat related and joint exercises more frequently 
is also likely an indicator of China’s growing military confidence. 
In addition to helping China to become a great power through supporting its 
military modernization, security cooperation also contributes to the goal of national 
rejuvenation by enabling China to visibly demonstrate itself as a first-rate power and 
responsible peer among international leaders. Bilateral and multilateral exercises offer the 
Chinese military a platform to showcase its desired image on the international stage.129 By 
showing its military strength to an international audience, China’s is able to make a visible 
argument for its status as a great power.130 It is aided in this endeavor by strategic media 
coverage of its bilateral and multilateral exercises. China’s media coverage of a recent 
exercise milestone demonstrates this tactic. China’s latest multilateral exercise with 
Southeast Asian states was the ASEAN-China Maritime Exercise-2018, taking place on 
October 2018 and representing the first joint maritime exercise among all 10 ASEAN 
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countries and China.131 In publicity surrounding the exercise, state owned Chinese media 
lauded the event, framing it as a “new milestone” for regional security cooperation and for 
building China’s desired “community of common destiny” in the region.132 
Beyond providing an opportunity to exhibit its growing strength, security 
cooperation also enables China to showcase that it is taking on new roles and 
responsibilities in the region commensurate with those of a great power. China’s intent in 
advancing this narrative of itself as a responsible international power is apparent in its 
public pronouncements. In the same document in which the Chinese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs espoused the “Chinese Dream” of national rejuvenation, China asserted that it is its 
responsibility to ensure the “prosperity and stability” of the region and to provide “more 
public security services to the Asia-Pacific region and the world at large.133 China has 
observed from existing global leaders like the United States that providing support to 
weaker states is among the accepted tasks of great powers.134  
China has increasingly sought opportunities to visibly execute such tasks in recent 
years. In addition to conducting training or military exercises with weaker, less militarily 
proficient states in Southeast Asia, China has stepped up its assistance to peripheral 
countries in the realm of non-traditional security support like HADR. For example, China 
sent rescue and medical teams to Malaysia and Myanmar in 2015 and 2016 after natural 
disasters in those countries.135 As mentioned previously, China’s hospital ship, the Peace 
Ark, has conducted multiple visits to Southeast Asia to provide humanitarian medical 
services in the wake of natural disasters or simply to provide assistance to areas whose 
medical infrastructure is relatively limited. For example, it visited the Philippines after 
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Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 and visited Timor-Leste in 2017.136 China’s participation in such 
activities is not unlike American interventions to provide non-traditional security support 
in similar instances. Consequently, and by design, when China conducts such interventions 
it likens itself to great power countries like the United States. 
2. Establish Influence in Key States that Can Be Used to Serve Chinese 
Interests 
Another objective that China is trying to achieve through closer security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia is its desire to establish influence in key countries that can 
then be leveraged to serve Chinese interests. By creating positive ties in Southeast Asia 
through mechanisms like security cooperation, China is building strategic relationships that 
can be called upon to serve its domestic and international agenda.137 China has already 
used security cooperation to this end in multiple Southeast Asian countries, including 
Myanmar, Cambodia, and Thailand.138 For example, while the relationship has not been 
wholly consistent throughout its tenure, China has largely been able to use its relationship 
with Myanmar to serve domestic interests.139 This dynamic began when China first started 
supplying Myanmar with support, including military equipment, in 1988.140 Since that 
time, China has had a substantial amount of influence in Myanmar, gaining access to 
crucial natural resources needed for China’s development and using the country to serve 
as China’s “eyes and ears” within ASEAN.141  
Similarly, China has offered substantial support to Cambodia, including military 
aid, for the express purpose of gaining influence within the country.142 As with Myanmar, 
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the strategy has borne fruit. Cambodia has reliably blocked the adoption of measures at 
ASEAN that China has found to be inimical to its interests, such as a joint statement on the 
South China Sea in 2012.143 Additionally, Cambodia supported China in its rejection of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling on the South China Sea in 2015.144 While it 
is not conclusive that China’s security support to Cambodia was a leading factor in the 
latter country’s decision to act in accordance with Chinese interests in these instances, 
China’s strong security relationship with Cambodia likely had some influence in the 
country’s calculus. In the same vein, though Thailand’s military relationship with the U.S. 
presents a limiting factor not present in Myanmar or Cambodia, China’s hope for Thailand 
is that it will also be a reliable partner that can help facilitate the more cooperative 
relationship that China desires in Southeast Asia.145 
There is evidence to suggest that China may be trying to pursue a similar strategy 
with the Philippines. Sensing an amenable recipient in President Duterte, China has offered 
to increase its engagement with the Philippines, including in the realm of security 
cooperation. During the Philippine crisis in Marawi in 2017, China provided weapons to 
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).146 China conducted a port visit with three naval 
warships in the same year, and the Philippines and China also expressed mutual interest in 
conducting joint military exercises in the future.147 Concurrently, the Philippines began to 
make policy changes in the interest of appeasing China.148 For example, President Duterte 
has been vocally critical of his country’s traditional ally and China’s strategic rival, the 
United States, and he has also significantly reduced the number of regular exercises that 
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the Philippines conducts with the United States.149 There is not a clear causal relationship 
between China’s recent efforts to expand security cooperation with the Philippines and the 
Philippines’ change in policy, as there are certainly other significant factors at play as well. 
However, it does seem apparent that China’s influence in the Philippines is increasing and 
that security cooperation is one of mechanisms that it can use to continue this trend. In turn, 
if this influence continues to grow, China could attempt to wield it more decisively to serve 
China’s interests. 
3. Undercut U.S. Encirclement and Dominance in the Region 
Lastly, China is also pursuing security cooperation in Southeast Asia in the interest 
of preventing U.S. encirclement and undercutting U.S. dominance in the region. China 
wants to undermine U.S. presence and influence in the region for multiple reasons. First, 
as indicated above, China is seeking to achieve regional preeminence as a reemergent great 
power. Naturally, if the United States retains a dominant security role Southeast Asia, then 
it presents an obstacle in China’s path to preeminence as long as American security 
relationships in the region remain strong. However, there is another, more deeply seated 
reason that China seeks to prevent U.S. encirclement. China has a legacy that is informed 
by a period of its history between 1839 and 1949 in which the country was dominated and 
subjected to “humiliation” by aggressive and intrusive Western imperialist powers, 
including the United States.150 This legacy has a reverberating impact that continues to 
inform Chinese policy today. In order to correct the injustices of that period of humiliation 
and to prevent their recurrence, China is determined to prevent any contemporary 
manifestations of great power encroachment by Western powers like the United States.151  
Since 2000, China has repeatedly sought to insert itself into countries in which the 
United States has an existing security relationship in order to try to undermine or supplant 
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extant U.S.-Southeast Asian relationships.152 China has used security cooperation as one 
of its tools in executing this strategy. For example, when U.S.-Philippine relations 
temporarily soured in 2004, China engaged in defense talks with the Philippines and also 
offered to donate heavy equipment to the country.153 More recently, when U.S.-Philippine 
relations became more strained after the election of President Duterte in 2016, China stood 
ready to offer assistance. In one specific example, after Duterte curtailed an arms shipment 
from the U.S. in response to American lawmakers’ criticism, China offered the Philippines 
small arms and patrol boats valuing $14 million and also offered $500 million in loans for 
additional Philippine acquisition of military equipment from China.154 China acted 
similarly with regard to Thailand when the United States decreased its security assistance 
to the country in 2006 following a military coup.155 Shortly thereafter, China extended $49 
million in military credit to the American ally.156 Similarly, when another coup in Thailand 
in 2014 again resulted in a reduction of U.S. security cooperation, China pursued closer 
security relations with the country and sent more defense delegations to visit.157 China has 
been comparably opportunistic with regard to Cambodia. American aid to Cambodia has 
consistently been subject to reduction or curtailment as a result of Cambodian human rights 
abuses.158 Concurrently, China developed a close security relationship with the country, as 
it repeatedly stepped in to provide the military support needed to make up for the loss of 
American support.159  
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In addition to opportunistically inserting itself into gaps in U.S. bilateral 
relationships with Southeast Asian states, China has been advocating a message designed 
to undermine the legitimacy of the U.S. presence in Asia. While not attacking the U.S. role 
in the region directly, President Xi Jinping has indirectly indicated publicly that he does 
not believe that the U.S. should have a dominant security role in Asia. During the 2014 
summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), he stated that Asians themselves should resolve security problems in the region.160 
Further, he stated that resolving problems in the region could be achieved through deeper 
regional cooperation.161 The implication of both of these statements is that outside powers, 
like the United States, should not be involved. 
4. Assuage Perceptions of Chinese Aggressiveness 
Another objective that China is trying to achieve through pursuing closer security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia is its desire to assuage regional perceptions of its 
aggressiveness. Chinese foreign policymakers are aware that some states in Southeast Asia 
see China’s growing military strength and its increasing use of coercive military power in 
the South China Sea as a threat and could seek to try to balance against it in response.162 
In order to counteract this perception of threat, and thereby reduce the likelihood that states 
will seek to balance against its rising strength, China is seeking to create a more benevolent 
image.163 Security cooperation is not the only means that China has at its disposal to 
inculcate a more positive image in Southeast Asia. China has been increasing its rate of 
foreign direct investment in the region and has initiated significant diplomatic, political, 
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and infrastructural investments under President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative.164 
However, security cooperation is an essential component of the overall effort, as it helps 
to create a positive impression of Chinese military power rather than a negative one. 
Positive and non-coercive interactions with the Chinese military through various methods 
of security cooperation help Southeast Asian states to see China as a “security partner” and 
a “security provider” intent on providing “positive contributions” to the region rather than 
as a security threat.165  
China’s public emphasis on the peaceful nature of its development also helps to 
alleviate the perception of China in Southeast Asia as an aggressive power intent upon 
domination. Chinese representatives have repeatedly stated that China “follows the path of 
peaceful development.”166 The implication here is that, as China becomes more powerful, 
it will not seek to dominate and suppress its neighbors by force; rather, it will seek to build 
“friendship and partnership” with them. China assures its neighbors that a regional security 
framework would not be a new mechanism through which China would dominate; rather, 
it would “be based on consensus,” serving “all parties’ needs” and ensuring that all regional 
security matters “be decided by all the countries in the region through equal 
participation.”167 Ultimately, China is eager for regional states to eschew “old thinking” 
regarding “balance of power, zero-sum games” and instead adopt a “win-win approach” 
oriented around greater cooperation, including in the security realm.168 
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Further, China has also sought to alleviate concerns about its growing strength by 
taking pains to explicitly link its rise to the wider prosperity of the region as a whole and 
to emphasize that its intentions are not self-serving. Instead, China’s ascendancy is 
mutually beneficial, as it “will bring greater opportunities and benefits for development 
and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region.”169 Rather than being a threat to the region, 
China’s growing strength is a net positive because it enables the entire region to gain 
influence. China seeks to strengthen regional security partnerships not for the sake of 
China’s individual benefit, but in order to keep Asia as a whole on a “positive trajectory” 
and to enable it to “play a bigger role on the world stage.”170  
5. Secondary Objectives Driving Chinese Security Cooperation in 
Southeast Asia 
In addition to the strategic level objectives indicated above, there are also some 
secondary, lower priority objectives driving Chinese security cooperation in Southeast 
Asia. Among these secondary objectives is intelligence collection. Military exercises with 
regional states represent opportunities to expose the PLA to foreign military tactics, 
capabilities, doctrine, command and control practices, and equipment.171 This information 
can be used to not only learn about foreign militaries but also to improve China’s own 
capabilities as its military continues to modernize. It is no coincidence that China often 
seeks to conduct exercises with military units in Southeast Asia that have received training 
from the United States.172 Training with such units enables China to not only glean specific 
information about American tactics, techniques, and procedures but also enables it to apply 
that knowledge to develop and improve upon its own doctrine and best practices.173 
Opportunities for intelligence collection are not just restricted to participation in or 
observation of military exercises. Senior level defense delegations in which PLA leaders 
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are able to meet with foreign defense officials are also an opportunity for China to glean 
personnel related intelligence on foreign political or military leaders or to learn strategic 
level intelligence regarding a foreign state’s internal politics or its intended actions at the 
international level.174  
D. FACTORS LIMITING SINO-SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY 
COOPERATION 
While China has made significant strides in defense diplomacy in Southeast Asia, 
and the trajectory suggests an upward trend, there are some factors that threaten to limit 
China’s progress. These include a poor Chinese reputation relative to other great powers 
regarding its military proficiency and the sophistication level of its military equipment, 
existing Southeast Asian defense relationships, and territorial sovereignty disputes in the 
South China Sea. It is possible that these obstacles may be resolved over time, for example 
through the waning of U.S. defense relationships in the region, through the resolution of 
territorial disputes, and through the steady increase in China’s military proficiency and 
technical capability. However, these resolutions are unlikely to occur in the short term, so 
the obstacles should persist in helping to limit the pace at which China can expand its 
security cooperation in Southeast Asia for now. The impact of the poor reputation of the 
Chinese military will be examined below, as that is an issue residing largely on the Chinese 
side of the equation. The impact of latter factors, such as existing Southeast Asian defense 
relationships and tensions emanating from conflicting sovereignty claims with Southeast 
Asian states in the South China Sea will be examined from the Southeast Asian perspective 
in Chapter IV. 
Relative to advanced Western powers like the United States, Chinese military 
proficiency and the quality of its military equipment is considered to be relatively poor. 
This impression impacts the interest of some Southeast Asian states in seeking or accepting 
higher levels of security cooperation with China. For example, when it comes to training, 
Southeast Asian officers attending courses in China have indicated a dissatisfaction with 
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the quality of the instruction and have expressed a preference for the superior quality of 
training in Western countries like the United States, Britain, or Australia.175 While China 
certainly has a larger and more capable military than Southeast Asian counterparts, 
reflections such as these indicate that Southeast Asian states still see Western states like 
the United States as superior military powers better able to provide the instruction and 
support they need to improve their own capabilities. However, it should be noted that this 
preference for training from Western powers cannot be taken for granted as a permanent 
dynamic. If the Chinese military continues to improve its capabilities and professional 
reputation, then the preference gap may close.  
This dissatisfaction extends from training to various military equipment that China 
sells to the region or offers as military aid. Low-tech Chinese equipment such as vehicles 
and small arms are generally considered adequate among some customers in Southeast 
Asia, especially among the least developed countries like Myanmar and Cambodia.176 
Relatively poor countries are attracted to inexpensive Chinese weapons, as their military 
acquisitions strategy emphasizes quantity over quality, and they value the fact that Chinese 
weapons tend to carry fewer “political strings” than Western weapons.177 Additionally, the 
Chinese weapons systems that these countries are importing tend to operate at a lower 
technological base than Western weapons do, which is an attractive feature in countries 
whose militaries have a limited level of technical know-how.178 Further, some countries 
are also attracted to Chinese arms because they are “free from political strings,” and often 
offer flexible repayment schemes.179 
However, while the relatively low cost and quality of Chinese military equipment 
has been a draw for some customers, these factors have had a significant limiting effect on 
                                                 
175 Storey, “China’s Bilateral Defense Diplomacy in Southeast Asia,” 297. 
176 Ibid, 300. 
177 Daniel Byman and Roger Cliff, China’s Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications (Santa Monica, 
CA: Rand Publishing, 1999), 24. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Guy Anderson, Craig Caffrey, and John Grevatt. “Defence exports in Asia: A focus on China” 
(Jane’s by IHS Markit Intelligence Briefing, September 6, 2018). 
 43 
the demand for Chinese arms exports writ large.180 The Chinese equipment simply cannot 
compete with modern, high-tech Western equipment due to having a reputation for poor 
quality, low durability, and a limited level of follow on support after purchase, such as the 
provision of ordnance, spare parts, or upgrades.181 This reputation has had a limiting effect 
on sales for even China’s closest defense allies in Southeast Asia. For example, in 2010, 
the Thai Navy indicated reluctance to accept a Chinese offer of secondhand submarines 
due to concern about the platforms’ reliability.182 It has also had a limiting effect on efforts 
to expand inroads into countries like the Philippines, whose defense relationship with 
China is still very limited. While the Philippines has accepted some Chinese military 
equipment, AFP members largely consider defense acquisitions from China to be 
unpreferable in comparison to procurements from the United States and impracticable due 
to concerns about interoperability with existing equipment.183 However, as it is likely the 
case that continued improvements in China’s military reputation might increase their 
desirability as a training partner, it is similarly likely that China’s continued advancement 
in military technology may increase their desirability as a military supplier in the future. 
As China’s weapons quality nears Western standards and its production capabilities 
advance, it will likely find new buyers and increase its share of the arms market.184 
E. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this chapter has demonstrated that China has been expanding its security 
cooperation in Southeast Asia since the turn of the 21st century, particularly in terms of the 
number of naval port calls and military exercises it conducts and in the volume of arms it 
exports to the region, in order to serve multiple strategic objectives. The primary objective 
is to regain regional preeminence and establish itself as a great power. Supporting 
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objectives include assuaging perceptions of its aggressiveness, establishing influence in 
key countries that can be leveraged to serve Chinese interests, and undercutting U.S. 
encirclement and dominance in the region. While security cooperation is not the only 
means to achieve these objectives, it is a vital tool that complements diplomatic and 
economic outreach efforts.  
However, this chapter has also demonstrated that, while China’s trajectory in this 
area is generally positive, it is not entirely unimpeded. There are limiting factors that China 
must address if it does not want to limit the potential of its continued security cooperation 
efforts, such as a poor Chinese reputation, relative to other great powers, regarding its 
military proficiency and the sophistication level of its military equipment. While the origin 
of this issue is internal to China, there are other, external factors that impact China’s ability 
to deepen security cooperation in Southeast Asia. These include existing Southeast Asian 
defense relationships and territorial sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea. The 
impact of these and other factors in influencing Southeast Asian states’ willingness to 
engage in security cooperation will be examined in Chapter IV.  
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III. ESTABLISHING THE SPECTRUM OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA AND SELECTING 
CASE COUNTRIES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes increasing Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation from 
the Southeast Asian side of the equation, establishing the range of individual Southeast 
Asian states’ efforts to seek, accept, or reject security cooperation with China during the 
period of 2000–2017. This analysis demonstrates that there is a wide spectrum of Southeast 
Asian security cooperation with China, along which some states have developed a 
relatively robust security relationship with China, some have allowed only a very limited 
security relationship to form, and others have occupied a lukewarm middle ground. This 
spectrum will be utilized as a tool for the selection of representative case study states that 
epitomize the range of Southeast Asian security cooperation with China. These states, and 
the factors impacting their security relationship with China, will be analyzed in greater 
detail in the subsequent chapter.  
B. RANGE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COOPERATION WITH 
CHINA 
The following sections will elaborate on the level of security cooperation that each 
Southeast Asian state has engaged in with China during the period of 2000–2017. 
Consistence with Chapter II, the level of security cooperation will be reflected in terms of 
the quantity of Chinese naval port calls that each state has hosted, the number and nature 
of military exercises that each stated has participated in with China, and the volume of 
arms that each state has imported from China. The data, summarized in Figures 3 and 4 
below, demonstrates that each country in Southeast Asia has sought or accepted some 
amount of security cooperation with China over the examined period, though there has 
been a significant degree of variation in terms of the type of activities conducted, when the 
activities started, and the total quantity of activities. 
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The figure above indicates the number of Chinese naval port calls that each Southeast Asian state has 
hosted and the number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises that each state has conducted 
with China for the period of 2000–2017. Naval port calls represent incidents in which PLAN ship(s) 
visited a Southeast Asian port of call. Naval port calls accompanied by drills are not also counted 
separately as exercises. Bilateral exercises are exercises between China and one Southeast Asian 
participant. Multilateral exercises are exercises in which China and at least one Southeast Asian state 
were participants or observers in an exercise involving more than two countries. Exercises do not 
include joint patrols or police activities. Data for the years 2000–2016 is sourced from Institute for 
National Strategic Studies’ China Strategic Perspectives publication, and data for the year 2017 is 
sourced from Open Source Enterprise and media reporting. 
Figure 3. Southeast Asian States’ Security Cooperation with China, 2000–
2017: Naval Port Calls and Exercises185  
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The figure above represents the annual volume of Chinese major conventional weapons exports to 
Southeast Asian states for the period of 2000–2017, reflected in trend-indicator value (TIV), which 
is based on the unit production costs of the transferred weapons. The TIV represents the transfer of 
military resources, not the sales price for the arms sales. SIPRI TIVs are expressed in millions.  
Figure 4. Chinese Arms Exports to Southeast Asian States, 2000–2017186 
1. Naval Port Calls  
Southeast Asian states have varied in terms of when they first hosted a Chinese 
naval ship for a port call and how frequently they have hosted subsequent port calls. For 
the examined period, the earliest hosts of Chinese port calls were Malaysia, Vietnam, and 
Singapore, hosting Chinese ships in 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, during a period in 
which China was only conducting one naval port call annually.187 Cambodia and East 
Timor were the latest states during the period to host a Chinese port call, in 2010 and 2016, 
respectively.188 Regarding quantity, the average number of total Chinese naval port calls 
hosted among Southeast Asian states, excluding landlocked Laos, is 5.1 (See Figure 3). 
While a state obviously cannot hold a partial port call, this number is useful to differentiate 
between states that have hosted Chinese naval ships at a higher or lower than average rate. 
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States falling above the average include Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, with 
Singapore hosting a total of nine port calls and the latter two countries hosting eight and 
seven, respectively.189 The remaining states in Southeast Asia each fall below the average, 
with the states on the lowest end of the spectrum being Brunei and East Timor, each with 
only two port calls hosted.190  
2. Military Exercises  
Southeast Asian states have also varied with regard to their participation with China 
in military exercises in terms of when they began conducting exercises, the total number 
of exercises in which they’ve participated, and what type of exercises they’ve conducted. 
In 2005, Thailand became the first Southeast Asian country to conduct a bilateral military 
exercise with China, and it remained the only country to conduct such exercises with China 
until 2009 when Singapore began doing so for the first time.191 On the other end of the 
spectrum, Cambodia and Myanmar began conducting bilateral military exercises with 
China in 2016 and 2017, respectively, while others, like the Philippines and Vietnam, 
continue to abstain from bilateral military exercises with China.192 Regarding quantity, the 
average number of bilateral exercises that states have conducted with China for the full 
examined time period, is about 2.5 (See Figure 3). States falling above the average include 
Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and states falling below the average include 
Cambodia, Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Laos, and East Timor. Thailand has 
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far and away conducted the most bilateral exercises with China, having conducted twelve 
exercises, which is twice as much as the second highest bilateral exercise participant with 
China, Singapore. Thailand is also unique in that it has conducted multiple exercises with 
China that have been focused around combat operations.193 Other Southeast Asian states 
that have conducted multiple bilateral exercises with China have tended to focus primarily 
on more non-traditional warfare areas, such as antiterrorism, search and rescue, and 
humanitarian and disaster response operations.194 
More Southeast Asian countries have participated in or observed multilateral 
exercises in which China was also a participant or observer than have directly participated 
in bilateral exercises with China, though there is still variance with regard to this kind of 
activity along the spectrum as well. China began participating in multilateral exercises with 
Southeast Asian countries in 2013 with inaugural ADMM-Plus exercises.195 That year, all 
ten ASEAN members participate in at least one of the exercises in with China, along with 
other Plus members.196 Regarding quantity, the average number of multilateral exercises 
that states have participated in with China for the full examined time period is about 8.3 
(See Figure 3). States falling above the average include Indonesia, with the most 
multilateral exercises with China, followed by Thailand and Malaysia, Singapore, and the 
Philippines. All other Southeast Asian states fall below the average. 
3. Arms Sales  
Chinese arms sales are also an area in which there is a broad spectrum of 
participation among Southeast Asian states, with some states being major customers of 
China, some purchasing relatively minimal amounts of Chinese arms, and others abstaining 
                                                 
193 Allen, Saunders, and Chen. “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” 
attachment. 
194 Ibid. 
195 ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, “ADMM-PLUS HADR & MM Ex Was Impressive” and 
ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting, “Inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting-Plus Maritime 
Security Field Training Exercise.” 
196 Allen, Saunders, and Chen. “Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications,” 
attachment. 
 50 
from any significant Chinese purchases altogether. Myanmar has been the most consistent 
importer of major conventional weapons from China, having imported from China every 
year between 2000 and 2017 (See Figure 4). Indonesia and Thailand are next in terms of 
annual consistency, having imported major conventional weapons from China for eleven 
and ten, respectively, out of the eighteen years examined, with the majority of those 
purchases occurring in the past several years. Laos and Cambodia round out the middle of 
the pack in terms of annual consistency of Chinese imports, having imported from China 
five and four, respectively, out of the eighteen years examined. Malaysia and East Timor 
are comparatively modest customers, having only imported arms from China in 2010 and 
2009, respectively. At the lowest end of the spectrum, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, 
and Brunei have not purchased any major conventional weapons from China for the entire 
examined period.  
Myanmar also leads Southeast Asian states in terms of volume of imports from 
China, having imported Chinese arms valuing 1,491 million SIPRI TIV over the period of 
2000–2017 (See Figure 4). Thailand is the second largest importer at 319 million SIPRI 
TIV, and Indonesia is the third largest at 313 million SIPRI TIV. Cambodia imported a 
comparatively smaller volume of Chinese arms in comparison with these states, valued at 
114 million SIPRI TIV; however, China has been Cambodia’s largest arms supplier over 
the examined period, which is not so for any of the top three Southeast Asian importers, 
including Myanmar. Other Southeast Asian importers of Chinese arms in Southeast Asia 
purchased relatively modest amounts with Laos, East Timor, and Malaysia importing major 
weapons from China over the examined period valued at 39, 18, and 5 million SIPRI TIV, 
respectively.  
C. SELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRIES FOR CASE STUDY  
Now that a spectrum for Southeast Asian security cooperation has been established, 
a representative sample of two countries may be selected for case study analysis in order 
to examine in greater detail the factors are influencing the degree to which Southeast Asian 
states seek, accept, or reject security cooperation with China. The intent is that countries 
selected for closer analysis represent key portions of the security cooperation spectrum, 
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with one being among the most active security cooperators with China and another being 
among the least active security cooperators. Additionally, the intent is also to select 
countries that represent both mainland and archipelagic Southeast Asia. Lastly, the intent 
is also to focus on countries that are strategically significant to the interests of the United 
States.  
Thailand and the Philippines meet this range of selection criteria. Thailand is above 
average on each of the quantifiable metrics indicated above. It was the first country to 
conduct bilateral exercises with China, has since conducted significantly more bilateral 
exercises with China than any other Southeast Asian country, and is second highest in terms 
of multilateral exercise participation with China. Thailand is above average in the region 
in terms of the number of Chinese port calls it has hosted, and it is second only to Myanmar 
in terms of the volume of arms imported from China over the examined time period. 
Additionally, Thailand is strategically important to the United States, representing one of 
two American treaty allies in the region and participating in wide range of security 
cooperation activities with U.S. forces annually. By comparison, the Philippines is below 
average on most of the quantifiable metrics indicated above. It has not conducted any 
bilateral exercises with China, and, while it has participated in some multilateral exercises 
with China, it is in the middle percentile for this metric. The Philippines is below average 
for the region in terms of the number of Chinese port calls it has hosted, and it has not 
imported any major conventional weapons from China. Lastly, the Philippines, like 
Thailand, is strategically important to the United States, as it is also an American treaty 
ally and a major participant in multiple forms of American security cooperation.  
D. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this chapter has demonstrated that the nature of Southeast Asian states’ 
security relationships with China is highly diverse. While some states have developed a 
security relationship with China that features relatively regular interaction in terms of naval 
port calls, bilateral exercises, multilateral exercises, and arms sales, other states have had 
limited or nonexistent engagements on these fronts, and others fall somewhere in between. 
Thailand and the Philippines represent two countries on opposite ends of this spectrum, 
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with Thailand being among China’s closest security cooperators in the region and the 
Philippines being among the least engaged. Now that the phenomenon of Chinese security 
cooperation has been examined from the Chinese side of the equation, the spectrum of 
Southeast Asian states’ cooperation has been established, and case study countries have 
been selected, the following chapter will examine in closer detail the factors that are 
impacting the selected states’ degree of interest in conducting security cooperation with 
China. 
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IV. SINO-SOUTHEAST ASIAN SECURITY COOPERATION: 
THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter analyzes Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation during the period 
of 2000–2017 from the Southeast Asian side of the equation, expanding upon concepts 
introduced in the literature review of Chapter I in order to fully address the sub-question: 
What factors influence the degree to which Southeast Asian states seek, accept, or reject 
Chinese security cooperation? In order to answer this question, this chapter applies each of 
the hypotheses introduced in Chapter I to the selected Southeast Asian countries of 
Thailand and the Philippines in order to explore the hypotheses’ explanatory power. 
Overall, the ensuing analysis demonstrates that the selected hypothesis factors are each 
relevant in influencing the degree to which Southeast Asian states conduct security 
cooperation with China, but they do not impact equally in each state. Specifically, the 
factors identified in Hypotheses 1 through 3, which have an expansive effect on the amount 
of security cooperation Southeast Asian states are willing to conduct with China, are active 
in both Thailand and the Philippines, but they produce a stronger effect in Thailand than in 
the Philippines. By contrast, Hypothesis 4, which has a limiting effect on the amount of 
security cooperation a state is willing to conduct with China, is more active in the 
Philippines than in Thailand, which accounts for why Philippine security cooperation with 
China is lower overall. Additionally, the analysis also demonstrates that the hypothesis 
factors, particularly those indicated in Hypotheses 1–3, can operate simultaneously to have 
an interactive, sometimes compounding, effect. This interaction will be expanded upon in 
more detail in the ensuing sections. 
This chapter proceeds in the following sub-sections. First, it tests Hypothesis 1 by 
evaluating whether decreased security cooperation with the United States has driven 
Thailand and the Philippines to seek or accept greater security cooperation with China. 
Next, it tests Hypothesis 2 by evaluating whether a desire to minimize their dependence on 
a single source of external security support has driven these states to engage in greater 
security cooperation with China. Third, it tests Hypothesis 3 by considering how major 
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domestic political changes, specifically changes in regime or political leadership that have 
been illiberal and/or accompanied by an increase in human rights abuses, have driven 
Thailand and the Philippines to seek or accept closer security cooperation with China. 
Then, it tests Hypothesis 4 by assessing how the presence or absence of major territorial 
disputes between these states and China has impacted the degree to which they conduct 
security cooperation with China. Lastly, this chapter offers some observations on some of 
the advantages the U.S. maintains over China with regard to preserving security 
relationships in Thailand and the Philippines and then closes with some concluding 
statements. 
B. FACTORS INFLUENCING THAI AND THE PHILIPPINE RATES OF 
SECURITY COOPERATION WITH CHINA 
1. Decreased U.S. Security Cooperation 
The amount of security cooperation that the United States conducts with states in 
Southeast Asia impacts the degree to which those states are amenable to security 
cooperation with China. Specifically, when U.S. security engagement wanes, states lean 
closer to China as an alternative means of support.197 Waning U.S. security engagement 
could be in the form of decreased arms sales or scaled back exercises; however, it could 
also be observable in the form of a decreased Southeast Asian perception of the U.S. 
security commitment to a specific state or to the region writ large. Both of these 
manifestations have been observable in Thailand and in the Philippines over the course of 
the examined time period. In both countries, there have been episodes in which U.S. 
security cooperation waned or faith in the U.S. security commitment decreased, followed 
by correlating increases in Chinese security cooperation, or at least correlating expressions 
of interest in greater Chinese security cooperation. However, while this phenomenon has 
been evident in both countries, it is has manifested more prominently in Thailand than in 
the Philippines.  
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In Thailand, there are multiple instances over the examined period during which 
U.S. security cooperation, measured in terms of arms sales and military training or 
exercises, decreased, and Chinese security cooperation correspondingly increased. The 
most notable instances occurred in 2006 and in 2014. In 2006, the United States suspended 
$24 million worth in military aid and curtailed sales of major conventional arms after Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was ousted from power (See Figure 5).198 The United States 
also suspended International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for 
Thailand, which enables foreign military members to come receive instruction at U.S. 
military facilities.199 Additionally, the United States threatened to cancel the 2007 iteration 
of the annual Cobra Gold exercises.200 Ultimately, the exercises were held, but they were 
reduced in scale, and the United States had to frame them as a multilateral, as opposed to 
bilateral, exercises in order to facilitate its participation.201 After this drawdown episode, 
the United States resumed normal security cooperation with Thailand in 2008 when a new 
Thai government was sworn in.202 In 2014, another drawdown in U.S. security engagement 
occurred. After another coup, the United States again suspended IMET funding and 
reduced the scale of Cobra Gold exercises.203 The United States also reduced military sales 
to Thailand (See Figure 5). However, as with the previous coup, the drawdown was only 
temporary. The United States dispatched a number of high-level visitors to Thailand in 
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2017 in an effort to repair the relationship, including then PACOM Commander Admiral 
Harry Harris and U.S. Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown.204 The following 
year, Cobra Gold exercises had already been scaled back up to pre-coup levels.205 
 
The figure above indicates the volume of transfers of major conventional weapons to Thailand from 
China and the United States, reflected in trend-indicator value (TIV), which is based on the unit 
production costs of the transferred weapons. The TIV represents the transfer of military resources, 
not the sales price for the arms sales. SIPRI TIVs are expressed in millions. 
Figure 5. Thailand Arms Imports from China and the U.S., 2000–2017206 
While the material impact to the U.S.-Thai security relationship was relatively 
short-lived after each of these incidents, the decrease in U.S. security cooperation during 
these periods was significant enough that it created a window of opportunity for Thailand 
to look elsewhere for support, and China was eager to oblige. After the 2006 coup, when 
the United States cut millions of dollars in military aid, Thai coup leader General Sonthi 
Boonyarataglin expeditiously conducted a visit to China, where the Chinese government 
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offered $49 million in military aid.207 Thailand used this money to then purchase Chinese 
military equipment, specifically $48 million worth of C-802 anti-ship missiles (ASMs).208 
The increased interaction with China was primarily in the realm of military aid of this kind 
and high level visits. There was not a notable increase in Chinese naval port calls to 
Thailand in 2006 or the years immediately following or in bilateral military exercises 
between China and Thailand.209 However, Thailand took advantage of some new military 
training opportunities with China during the period of decreased U.S. support, for example 
dispatching thirty special forces soldiers to conduct training with China in Guangzhou.210  
The increase in Thai security cooperation with China during the 2014 drawdown of 
U.S. support was more notable than during the 2006 drawdown, both in the areas of military 
aid and procurement and in military exercises. Since 2014, Thailand has significantly 
increased its purchase of major conventional Chinese weapons, to include MBTs, armored 
personnel carriers, and diesel submarines.211 In fact, Chinese arms sales to Thailand 
eclipsed U.S. sales, with China selling arms valued at 209 million SIPRI TIV to Thailand 
over the course of 2015–2017, and with the U.S. selling arms worth less than half of that 
amount at 102 million SIPRI TIV over the same time period (See Figure 5). Furthermore, 
unlike in 2006, there was a notable increase in Thailand’s exercise activity with China 
when the U.S. scaled back support in 2014, both quantitatively and qualitatively. Thailand 
conducted three exercises with China in 2013, one bilateral and two multilateral, and two 
pre-coup exercises, both multilateral, with China in 2014.212 There was a slight uptick in 
Thai military exercise activity with China in subsequent years. In 2015, Thailand and China 
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conducted a total of five exercises together, one bilateral and four multilateral.213 The 
bilateral exercise, Falcon Strike 2015, was particularly notable, as it marked the first time 
that the Chinese and Thai air forces held an exercise together.214 Exercise activity between 
Thailand and China remained elevated in 2016, with the countries again conducting five 
exercises together that year, this time two bilateral and three multilateral.215 There was no 
notable increase in the number of port calls that China conducted to Thailand in the years 
immediately following 2014.  
There is a clear pattern from 2006 and 2014 demonstrating that Thai security 
cooperation with China has increased during periods in which Thai cooperation with the 
U.S. has decreased; but the actual, measurable amount of U.S. security engagement is not 
the only relevant factor contributing to this trend. The perceived level of the U.S. security 
commitment to Thailand, and the U.S. capability to live up to that commitment, is also 
important in shaping Thailand’s calculus with regard to its security relationship with China. 
In recent years, there are many indications that Thailand’s faith in the U.S. security 
commitment to itself and the region has been waning. When asked to rate the current U.S. 
president’s level of engagement in Southeast Asia, a 2019 survey of Thai academics, 
businessmen, government members, civil society organization members, and media 
members produced resoundingly negative results, with 72.8% agreeing that U.S. 
engagement had decreased.216 In the same survey, when asked to rate U.S. reliability as a 
strategic partner and as a guarantor of regional security, 43.5% of respondents indicated 
that they had little or no confidence in the U.S. in this respect; comparatively, only 20.9% 
of respondents reported being confident or very confident.217 A separate bilateral dialogue 
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in 2018 with Thai leaders revealed a similar sentiment, with Thai interviewees revealing a 
long-standing concern about U.S. reliability in the event of a crisis.218 The Thai military 
still expresses the view that the U.S. security guarantee is important, but even respondents 
among that cadre indicated in 2017 that they felt that U.S. influence had been overtaken by 
Chinese influence in the region, and they estimated that the two countries now have equal 
influence on Thai national security policy.219 It is likely that these kinds of sentiments, in 
combination with the intermittent, though admittedly brief, drawdowns in U.S. support 
have also had an effect on Thailand’s greater consideration of China as an increasingly 
active alternative security partner.  
There is some evidence of a similar pattern in the Philippines wherein a U.S. 
reduction in security cooperation corresponded with an increased interest in security 
cooperation with China, but the phenomenon is much less prominent in the archipelagic 
nation in comparison with its mainland counterpart. A key example occurred in 2004. That 
year, the United States temporarily suspended some military aid to the Philippines after 
President Macapagal Arroyo had made a decision to withdraw AFP forces from Iraq.220 
Shortly thereafter, President Macapagal Arroyo conducted a state visit to China and met 
with Chinese President Hu Jintao, and the two parties agreed to begin conducting high-
level talks on security cooperation and on opportunities to increase military exchange 
visits, among other security related issues.221 Later that year, in November of 2004, the 
Philippine defense secretary and the Chinese defense minister signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Defense Cooperation in which China proposed conducting more military 
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exchanges.222 Subsequently, in May of 2005, the two countries held the first Philippines-
China Defense and Security Dialogue, at which time China offered $1.2 million in 
engineering equipment for the AFP that was subsequently delivered in 2006.223  
However, while these developments represented significant initial steps, closer 
security ties with China did not manifest as strongly in the Philippines during this period 
as they did in Thailand during rocky periods in their own security relationship with the 
United States. For one thing, the Philippines did not increase its procurement from China; 
in fact, it has still not imported any major conventional arms from China.224 The Philippines 
did not conduct any bilateral exercises with China in the Macapagal Arroyo years and has 
still not held any such exercises subsequently.225 While China proposed beginning bilateral 
exercises when the Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated, the Philippines 
declined to take this step.226 Additionally, the Philippines did not begin to participate in 
multilateral exercises with China until several years later.227 The Philippines did host a 
Chinese destroyer and replenishment ship in 2006 for a port call.228 While it was only a 
single port call during the period in which the U.S.-Philippine security relationship had 
become temporarily strained, it is worth noting, as such occurrences in the Philippines are 
quite infrequent. No Chinese naval ship had made a port call to the Philippines for several 
years preceding that, prior to the period examined in this thesis. 
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This period during the Macapagal Arroyo presidency does not represent the only 
time since the turn of the 21st century that U.S. security cooperation decreased in the 
Philippines to some degree. However, other incidents of decreased U.S. security 
engagement were initiated by the Philippines, not the United States. After assuming office 
in 2016, President Duterte conducted a visit to Beijing during which he announced 
explicitly that he intended to “break up” the Philippines’ security ties with the United States 
and seek a stronger security relationship with China.229 While U.S. security ties with the 
Philippines remain solidly intact, and Philippine security cooperation with China remains 
very limited, President Duterte has succeeded in facilitating some changes consistent with 
his stated goal. Early in his presidency, he either canceled or reduced in scope a number of 
military exercises between American forces and the AFP.230 President Duterte ultimately 
agreed to allow bilateral exercises with the U.S. to continue in light of AFP resistance to 
cancelling them altogether; however, he reduced the overall number of war games from 28 
to 13, he reoriented the surviving exercises to focus on humanitarian assistance or counter-
terrorism instead of territorial defense, and he still cancelled some major exercises outright, 
including Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT) and Philippine 
Amphibious Landing Exercise PHIBLEX.231 
However, as with the previous period in which the U.S.-Philippine security 
relationship suffered during President Macapagal Arroyo’s term, there has been a 
corresponding growth in the Sino-Philippine relationship, but it has been relatively limited 
in scope. President Duterte has not begun to import major conventional weapons from 
China, but he has acquired some Chinese military equipment while simultaneously seeking 
to decrease imports from the United States. For example, when Duterte revoked the 
Philippine acquisition of 26,000 American rifles in 2016, he turned to China, procuring 
weapons and patrol boats worth $14 million and securing $500 million in financing for 
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future Chinese acquisitions.232 According to Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group 
(JUSMAG) officials in Manila with whom the author met on April 4, 2019, China has 
subsequently supplied the Philippine military with deliveries of other military equipment 
on a sporadic basis, to include rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), small patrol boats, and 
heavy earth-moving equipment. It is possible that Philippine acquisitions of Chinese 
equipment will increase moving forward. In 2017, the Philippine Department of National 
Defense (DND) signed a letter of intent with one of China’s biggest defense companies in 
order to enable both sides to explore new opportunities for defense trade.233 Chinese naval 
port call activity to the Philippines has remained relatively modest, but China did conduct 
a port call to the Philippines in 2017, ending a several years’ long hiatus for such activity.234 
There has been no movement on the bilateral exercises front, and it seems unlikely that the 
Philippines and China will conduct such activities imminently; however, President Duterte 
has suggested openly that the two countries should consider conducting such exercises in 
the future.235 
As is the case with Thailand, the perceived level of the U.S. security commitment 
to the Philippines, and the perceived U.S. reliability to live up to that commitment among 
leading defense and political figures in the Philippines, is also relevant in shaping the 
state’s calculus with regard to its security relationship with China. Coincident with 
President Duterte’s lean towards China, certain circles in the Philippines have begun to 
express doubt about whether the United States has sufficient interest or capability in 
fulfilling its commitments to the Philippines as the country’s primary security partner. 
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Among Philippine leaders, President Duterte has been the most vocal in expressing doubt 
about the reliability of the United States, as he has insinuated publicly that the United States 
has not only been deliberately passive in preventing China from building infrastructure in 
the South China Sea but is also unlikely to aid the Philippines militarily in the event of an 
armed confrontation with China in those waters.236 However, President Duterte is not alone 
in his concern. Philippine Secretary of National Defense Delfin Lorenzana has indicated 
dissatisfaction with the U.S-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty and has called for its 
review.237 According to Assistant Secretary for Assessments and International Affairs for 
the Philippine DND Teodoro Torralba, Secretary Lorenzana’s public dissatisfaction 
emanates from a concern that the current framework allows for a lack of clarity about what 
kind of support the Philippines can expect from the United States in the event of Chinese 
incursions into Philippine-claimed territory that fall short of an armed attack.238  
In addition to these specific concerns about the U.S. willingness to come to the 
Philippines’ defense in the South China Sea, there is also a more general sense in the 
Philippines that the United States is losing influence in the region and is both less reliable 
and more disinterested in its role as a strategic ally. When asked to reflect on U.S. influence 
today in comparison with one year ago, the Trump administration’s level of engagement 
in Southeast Asia, and U.S. reliability as a strategic partner for the Philippines and purveyor 
of security for the region writ large, 52.3% of surveyed Philippine academics and 
government officials expressed a negative view, describing each of these areas as having 
“deteriorated.”239 In combination, these doubts about the U.S.-Philippine security 
relationship have directly contributed to the Philippine shift, admittedly modest, towards 
China. The shift emanates directly from the growing sense that, given perceived U.S. 
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unreliability to adequately protect the Philippines in the event of a conflict in the South 
China Sea, learning to coexist and cooperate more closely with an emergent China is the 
only option.240 
2. Diversification 
As has been demonstrated in the previous section, there have been multiple 
episodes in both Thailand and the Philippines in which each country sought closer security 
ties with China during periods in which U.S. security engagement decreased, or faith in the 
U.S. security commitment waned. However, the shift towards China during these periods 
can’t be attributed solely to changes in U.S. engagement. Other, related factors were also 
at play during these episodes that are assessed to have had a simultaneous impact on the 
degree to which Thailand and the Philippines have sought to deepen security cooperation 
with China. Among these has been an expressed desire on the part of both Thailand and 
the Philippines to diversify security partnerships and thereby reduce dependency on a 
single ally, specifically the United States. This factor is observable in both Thailand and 
the Philippines. Both countries have demonstrated an explicit interest in diversifying 
security partnerships for both strategic and practical purposes, though Thailand has gone 
further than the Philippines in taking concrete steps to make diversification a reality. 
Instances of increased security cooperation with China for the examined period were 
largely covered in section 1 and will not be rehashed in detail in this and subsequent 
sections. Rather, the purpose of this and the following sections is to demonstrate that other 
factors were simultaneously at play contributing to the trend. 
Thailand has frequently indicated an interest in diversification since the beginning 
of the period examined in this thesis and has concurrently taken multiple concrete steps, 
across multiple leadership changes, that have resulted in Thailand building closer security 
relationships with more bilateral partners other than the United States, including China. 
For example, in 2001, Prime Minister Thaksin stated publicly that he was interested in 
expanding Thailand’s strategic options and diversifying sources from which Thailand 
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imported military equipment.241 It is not a coincidence that Thailand passed some 
significant security milestones with China shortly thereafter. Not long after his statement, 
Prime Minister Thaksin visited Beijing and signed a join strategic-cooperation agreement 
with China.242 The next year, in 2002, Thailand and China initiated annual defense security 
consultations, which eventually paved the way for the two countries’ first bilateral military 
exercise, held in 2005.243  
This interest in developing closer security relationships with non-U.S. partners has 
persisted over time, sometimes coinciding with the periods in which U.S. security 
engagement waned. For example, Thailand reiterated its interest in diversification of 
security cooperation in the years following the 2014 coup that brought Prayut Chan-o-cha 
to power and also featured a drawdown in U.S. support.244 Subsequently, trends 
demonstrate an effort on the part of Thailand to increase its cooperation with China in 
order, at least in part, to reduce dependence on the U.S. As indicated in Figure 5, Thai 
military imports from China significantly increased in the years following the 2014 coup 
and included some of Thailand’s most notable purchases from China to date, such as three 
diesel submarines. This procurement shift is likely to endure; U.S. dominance of Thai arms 
imports is likely a thing of the past.245 In terms of other forms of engagement, as indicated 
in section 1, it was also during this same timeframe that Thailand and China achieved a 
new milestone in exercise activity, conducting a joint air force exercise for the first time in 
2015 in addition to existing annual naval and army exercises.246 
Thailand’s interest in diversification is driven by both strategic and practical 
considerations. Thailand is seeking to establish and maintain a balance among its relations 
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with major powers, specifically the United States and China, in order to ensure that it does 
not become overly dependent on one power, thereby imbuing an outside entity with 
disproportionate influence that would infringe on Thailand’s autonomous sovereign 
agency.247 Additionally, diversification with regard to security cooperation is also a useful 
strategic lever that Thailand employs in its foreign policy.248 Buying arms from new 
sources or buying arms at a higher volume from existing sources, like China, is one way in 
which Thailand can indicate goodwill to another country on the foreign policy stage. 
Another strategic consideration is that, if Thailand is overly dependent on a single source, 
then it is particularly vulnerable in the event of any lapse in support from that single source. 
Thai military officers expressed this concern about U.S. support in a recent survey, 
indicating that they found the U.S. to be unreliable as a supplier.249 One solution to U.S. 
unreliability as a supplier is to import larger volumes from a broader range of partners, 
including China. 
From a practical standpoint, diversifying sources from which Thailand receives 
military support and creating a closer security relationship with China is also driven by 
cost considerations, particularly with regard to procuring new military equipment. In fact, 
Thai military officials cite cost as the most important factor that has caused them to see 
Chinese equipment as more attractive in recent years.250 While Thai military officials do 
consider U.S. equipment to be desirable in terms of quality, it is not always affordable in 
terms of cost.251 When it has come to major recent purchases like MBTs or even 
submarines, China has simply had the right price. These cost considerations are particularly 
important in recent years as Thailand has made military modernization a major priority. 
During a period in which Thailand is seeking to upgrade its military equipment, it makes 
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sense to diversify and pursue lower cost options in order to get a “bigger bang for the buck.” 
It should also be noted that sometimes changes in purchasing behavior are neither strategic 
or practical. In some cases, Thailand may opt for more Chinese purchases as a result of key 
Thai officials being targeted for bribes and kickbacks if they choose a Chinese import over 
an American one.252 
Like Thailand, the Philippines has also indicated that diversification is increasingly 
desirable in its security relationships. Assistant Secretary Torralba identified 
diversification with regard to security cooperation as a current priority for the 
Philippines.253 President Duterte has also been a vocal proponent of diversification, noting 
not long after his election in 2016 that he aspired to acquire new military equipment from 
countries like Russia and China in order to reduce dependency on the Philippines’ primary 
security partner, the United States.254 As has been indicated in section 1, while there has 
been some small shift towards acquiring more Chinese equipment, it’s been relatively 
modest, especially in comparison with Thailand. Overall, while the rhetoric indicating an 
interest in diversification has been frequent since President Duterte’s election, specifically 
couched in terms of greater security cooperation with China and Russia, actual 
manifestation in the form of significant procurements from these countries or in the form 
of bilateral exercises with them has yet to become a reality.  
As with Thailand, the interest in diversification is both strategic and practical. From 
the strategic perspective, the push for greater diversification is code for the Philippines’ 
interest in achieving a more independent foreign policy.255 The push for diversification is 
driven by the Philippines’ interest developing more strategic partnerships so that it is not 
overly reliant on a single partner and thus encumbered to act in a manner consistent with 
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the pressures exerted by that partner. In diversifying its array of security relationships, the 
Philippines hopes to not only become less dependent on the United States for security 
support but also more able to make its own foreign policy choices rather than just following 
the U.S. lead. Assistant Secretary Torralba echoed these sentiments, noting that 
diversification is driven by an aspiration for the Philippines to be less dependent on the 
United States so that it is free to more fully assert its own independent agency.256  
From a practical perspective, the Philippines is also concerned with cutting costs 
just like Thailand, particularly in the midst of its own military modernization. Assistant 
Secretary Torralba frequently cited cost as a leading concern when discussing the 
Philippine justification for diversification, highlighting certain recent purchases and 
prospective purchases in which the Philippines has chosen to import from alternative, 
sometimes new, partners.257 For example, he noted that the Philippines decided to import 
South Korean FA-50 aircraft rather than more expensive Western alternatives because they 
were cheaper but still judged to be effective for their desired purpose. Additionally, he 
indicated that the Philippine military is seeking to purchase new heavy helicopters in order 
to enhance Philippine HADR capabilities as one of its military modernization priorities. 
However, he stated that the Philippines would likely not consider U.S. Chinook helicopters 
for the purchase, as they are simply too expensive.  
It’s possible that these practical, cost cutting considerations will lead the 
Philippines to also begin importing major conventional arms from China at some point in 
the future. For now, there are no indications of any imminent major Philippine purchases 
from China.258 However, there is some potential for a shift in this direction. As indicated 
previously, President Duterte has expressed a clear interest in Chinese imports. 
Additionally, the Philippine military has expressed frustration about the U.S. procurement 
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process, indicating that it is too lengthy and cumbersome.259 China may be able to exploit 
President Duterte’s motivations and the military’s frustrations if it is able to offer sales that 
meet the Philippines’ practical concerns regarding cost, expediency of delivery, and overall 
ease with regard to the procurement process.  
3. Illiberal Political Transitions and Human Rights Abuses 
Another relevant factor that is assessed to have an impact on Southeast Asian states’ 
decision to seek or accept closer security cooperation with China is the occurrence of 
illiberal political transitions or the prevalence of human rights abuses. When these 
conditions have been present in either Thailand or the Philippines, there has been a 
correlating shift in these states’ security relationships with the United States and China, 
though the phenomenon has been more modest in the Philippines. This factor is related to 
the previous two factors and often occurs simultaneously, or even as an instigating catalyst. 
The periods during which the United States was critical of Thailand and the Philippines or 
even withdrew some security cooperation, or the periods in which the two Southeast Asian 
countries sought to diversify by accepting greater cooperation from China, have sometimes 
been preceded by incidents like military coups in Thailand or human rights abuses in the 
Philippines.260 So, these episodes of illiberalism and human rights abuses are powerful in 
terms of their catalytic capability in relation to these two other factors. However, they are 
especially significant because they create a rift between the United States and the 
Philippines and Thailand that can weaken the security relationship over time and create 
space for Chinese cooperation to take root.  
The U.S.-Thai security relationship suffered significant damage in the wake of the 
2014 coup especially, with Thai partners being left with a perception that the United States 
had treated them unfairly with an overly harsh response. The U.S. response to this coup 
took a harder line than responses to previous ones, because the 2014 coup was particularly 
severe in terms of restrictions on civil liberties, and there was significant doubt at the time 
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as to when, or whether, democratic rule would be restored.261 The United States was 
particularly public and vocal in its criticism of Thailand regarding the state of democracy 
and human rights in the country following the 2014 coup, where previously the United 
States had reserved much of its criticism for private diplomatic channels.262 Additionally, 
as required by U.S. law, the United States suspended millions of dollars in IMET and 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), but the United States also went further than legal 
mandates with the cancellation of multiple high-level engagements, training exchanges, 
and exercises.263  
U.S. rhetoric and the withdrawal of support triggered a significant backlash in 
Thailand against the United States that had the effect of shaking faith in U.S. reliability as 
an ally and weakening the alliance overall.264 Thailand largely perceived the U.S. response 
to be hypocritical, noting that the United States treated other countries, like Egypt, that had 
also had coups much more leniently.265 Thai leaders, including military leadership, had 
seen the U.S. relationship as a special friendship, and they felt as though they had been 
jilted by the U.S. rebuke.266 Thai elites had expected that the United States would 
understand Thailand’s need to assert military control, and that the American alliance would 
be resilient and steadfast as the country’s government transitioned.267 Once it became 
apparent that this would not be the case, frustration emerged among Thai elites that the 
U.S. conception of democracy has become too narrow.268 In Thailand, the coup was 
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considered a necessary maneuver to dissolve a corrupt and ineffective government and get 
the country on a better track. Furthermore, there is was a sense in Thailand that, while 
restoring elections was important, they were of secondary importance to that more 
immediate purpose, and they should not have been the singular measure by which Thai 
governance was judged to be legitimate. When the U.S., according to the Thai perspective, 
did not appreciate the nuances and local complexities of Thai governance, Thai elites were 
caught off guard. This sense of jiltedness by the U.S. cut deeply and has persisted over 
time, damaging Thai perceptions of U.S. intentions for years afterward. When asked in a 
2017 survey which country they perceived as the greatest external threat to Thailand, Thai 
military officers reported that they viewed the United States as the top threat, likely driven 
out of a concern that their traditional ally could someday seek to interfere directly in 
Thailand’s domestic politics.269 
The U.S.-Philippine security relationship also suffered significant damage in the 
wake of U.S. criticism regarding human rights abuses. At the beginning of his presidency 
in 2016, President Duterte initiated a crackdown, with a “war on drugs” campaign that 
resulted in thousands of extrajudicial killings resulting in as many as 1,000 deaths per 
month during the first eight months of his tenure in office.270 In response, the Obama 
administration was highly critical of President Duterte, suspended certain shipments of 
military equipment, and also postponed the renewal of an aid package worth hundreds of 
millions of dollars.271 President Duterte has not been shy in his identification of this 
criticism, and these actions, as triggering factors for why his taste for the U.S. security 
relationship has soured and his interest in China has increased.272 In fact, he initially 
followed his predecessor President Aquino’s lead in adopting a balancing strategy against 
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China that hinged on deepening the security relationship with the United States.273 It was 
only after his government was the recipient of vocal U.S. criticism that he altered his 
calculus. This pattern has been consistent over time. Each time that President Duterte 
receives renewed criticism from the West regarding human rights concerns, he offers 
immediate and vocal pushback that is also sometimes accompanied with material 
ramifications.274 For example, the timing of President Duterte’s rejection of a delivery of 
American military rifles in 2016 is directly linked to vocal opposition to the sale on the 
basis of human rights concerns among members of the U.S. Senate.275 President Duterte’s 
rhetoric also makes clear that instances in which he has expressed support for 
diversification and outreach to China are linked to his disdain for American criticism.  
China is uniquely suited to exploiting the sense of grievance that Thailand and the 
Philippines have felt during periods of heightened U.S. criticism. China does not have the 
same qualms about cooperating with countries that are undemocratic or that have a poor 
human rights record.276 In fact, it has a long history of providing military support to regimes 
with egregious human rights abuses, like Myanmar. Additionally, as an authoritarian state, 
China is in no position to advise states like Thailand on the functioning, or lack thereof, of 
its democracy, nor is China interested in doing so.277 Consequently, there is a sense that 
China is judgment-free with regard to its security relationships and that it will not attach 
strings to cooperation to the same degree that the United States does. During instances of 
heightened U.S. criticism and withdrawal, this comparatively agnostic support can be 
appealing, as has been demonstrated by coincident periods of heightened Thai and 
Philippine engagement with China covered in section 1. 
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4. Territorial Disputes 
A final factor that this thesis finds to have significant impact on the degree to which 
Thailand and the Philippines seek, accept, or reject security cooperation with China is the 
presence or absence of a territorial dispute with China. The existence of a significant 
territorial dispute with China is a major limiting factor on the degree to which a Southeast 
Asian state will conduct security cooperation with China.278 This finding is borne out with 
regard to Thailand and the Philippines. The Philippines has a major maritime territorial 
dispute with China in the South China Sea. By contrast, Thailand does have some concerns 
with regard to Chinese activity in the Mekong region, but its dispute is not comparable to 
the scale of the Philippine dispute in the South China Sea. The existence of a significantly 
stronger territorial dispute is a primary reason why, despite featuring all of the other same 
factors that Thailand has, such as a demonstrated pattern of greater interest in 
diversification and Chinese security cooperation during periods of weakened U.S. 
engagement or heightened U.S. criticism on the basis of human rights abuses, the 
Philippine security relationship with China remains much more limited.  
In the Philippines, there is a correlation between the limitation of Chinese security 
cooperation inroads to the country and the intensity of the maritime territorial dispute in 
the South China Sea. This correlation was first evident during the Macapagal Arroyo 
administration (2001-2010), when tensions first began to significantly ratchet up. As 
indicated previously, there was a degree of modest increased openness between the 
Philippines and China in regard to security cooperation during the early 2000s. However, 
when China’s behavior became much more assertive in the South China Sea, these inroads 
were largely curtailed, as China began to be seen as a security threat rather than a benign 
rising power.279 There were a number of incidents that contributed to this shift in 
perceptions. In 2009, China submitted its nine-dash line claim to a U.N. commission, 
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asserting that it had sovereignty over the entire South China Sea and the islands therein.280 
Subsequently, China began to expel foreign fishermen, including Filipino fishermen, from 
its newly claimed waters.281 China then harassed a Philippine survey ship conducting oil 
exploration in the Reed Bank in 2009, established a presence at Scarborough Shoal and 
began to turn Philippine ships away in 2012, established a Chinese Coast Guard presence 
at Second Thomas Shoal in 2013, and then initiated substantial land reclamation and 
infrastructure development operations on a number of claimed formations, among other 
incidents.282 
Largely in response to these Chinese actions in the South China Sea, the subsequent 
Philippine president, President Benigno Aquino III, shifted his country’s policy towards 
China. Whereas his predecessor had begun to initiate security relations with China, Aquino 
curtailed this progress and instead adopted a balancing strategy against China and 
promoted closer security cooperation with the United States through measures like the 
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).283 While President Duterte has tried 
to shift away from Aquino’s strategy of balancing against China, he has been limited by 
the persistence and potency of the South China Sea dispute. His handling of the dispute is 
the one issue area in which President Duterte is unpopular domestically.284 The Philippine 
public has been vocally critical of Chinese aggression, on occasion holding large 
demonstrations to protest Chinese claims of sovereignty and provocative actions in the 
South China Sea.285 This kind of public opposition places a limitation on President 
Duterte’s outreach to China, as he is at risk of a domestic backlash if he pushes warmer 
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relations too far.286 In fact, as long as the territorial dispute remains unresolved, it is highly 
unlikely that the Philippines will make significant additional steps with China with regard 
to security cooperation, such as with the initiation of major conventional arms purchases 
from China, regardless of President Duterte’s rhetoric indicating an interest in doing so.287 
By contrast, the lack of a major territorial dispute between Thailand and China has 
enabled the former country to remain more receptive over time to Chinese cooperation than 
countries like the Philippines.288 It is likely not a coincidence that, overall, China’s largest 
customers for sales of military equipment in Southeast Asia are those countries with which 
China does not have a territorial dispute.289 Additionally, China’s most active bilateral 
exercise partners in Southeast Asia have been those countries with which China does not 
have a territorial dispute.290 Thailand’s own security cooperation activity with China is 
consistent with these trends. As indicated in Chapter III, Thailand is the second largest 
importer of Chinese military equipment in Southeast Asia, and it has conducted more 
bilateral exercises with China than any other country in the region.291 
One of the reasons Thailand cooperates more with China is likely related to a 
different threat perception of China, in comparison with the Philippine threat perception, 
that derives from the absence of a territorial dispute. Overall, the Thai perception of the 
Chinese threat is lower than that of states like the Philippines.292 A 2019 survey of 
Southeast Asian academics and military officials demonstrates the disparity.293 When 
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questioned about how they viewed “China’s reemergence as a major power with respect to 
Southeast Asia,” 30.1% of Thai respondents indicated that they viewed China as a status 
quo power that would not undermine the current regional order. By contrast, only 7.3% of 
Filipino respondents held the same view of China and its intentions. There were a 
significant number of Thai respondents that reported having a more negative view of 
China, but this number was also significantly smaller than the corresponding number 
Filipino respondents with a negative view. Specifically, 45.1% of Thai respondents 
indicated that they believe that China is a revisionist power with an interest in turning 
Southeast Asia “into its sphere of influence,” while 66.4% of Filipino respondents reported 
having that view. It should be stated that the respondents were not specifically asked about 
whether the presence or absence of a territorial dispute directly contributed to their view of 
China. However, their responses certainly demonstrate at least a strong correlation between 
the two issues.  
While Thailand does not have a dispute with China comparable to a conflicting 
South China Sea claim, Thailand does harbor some opposition to China with regard to the 
latter country’s behavior in the Mekong region. The Mekong River runs through Thailand, 
and its significance extends to key areas such as national security and sovereignty.294 
China’s behavior on the river is thus a sensitive issue for Thailand. China has been 
constructing dams, leading to a major drop in the water level on a portion of the river shared 
with Thailand.295 China has also been blasting and dredging areas of the river bed and 
conducting security patrols on the Mekong.296 These activities have all contributed to a 
growing sense of grievance among Thai political and military leaders.297 China’s actions 
in the Mekong are a sovereignty concern for Thailand.298 The Thai military is concerned 
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about Chinese encroachment in the area, a concern that is compounded by an increasing 
sense of encirclement wrought by increasing Chinese engagement in the surrounding 
countries of Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos. Thailand has liked to maintain a strategic 
buffer around itself and that Chinese activity in the Mekong as well as Chinese inroads in 
surrounding countries have created a sense that this buffer is disappearing.299 For now, it 
does not appear that these concerns are presenting a significant impediment to Thai security 
cooperation with China, certainly not to the degree that territorial concerns impact 
Philippine cooperation with China. However, it is possible to envision that, if Chinese 
behavior in the Mekong becomes more provocative and Thailand feels increasingly 
pinched by a growing Chinese presence in bordering states, then Thai engagement with 
China could someday become more limited as a result.  
C. U.S. COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE IN THAILAND AND THE 
PHILIPPINES 
While there are a number of factors that have caused Thailand and the Philippines 
to seek or accept closer security cooperation with China, such as periods of drawdown in 
U.S. support or periods of heightened emphasis on diversification sometimes brought on 
after episodes of illiberalism or human rights abuses, there are still areas in which the 
United States maintains a strong comparative advantage over China. These advantages 
have had a limiting effect on how far U.S.-Thai or U.S.-Philippine security cooperation has 
eroded and how much Sino-Thai or Sino-Philippine cooperation has been able to expand. 
The advantages stem from a long-term institutionalization of the U.S. relationship within 
the military cadre in both countries. This institutionalization has created a bond between 
host nation militaries and U.S. counterparts based on interoperability and personal 
relationships that reinforces a strong preference for U.S. support over Chinese support 
within Thai and Philippine militaries that goes on to reverberate at the political level.  
In both Thailand and the Philippines, the military cadres maintain a strong 
preference for the United States as a security partner. The is true across a range of 
cooperation areas, from military equipment and training to interpersonal interactions at the 
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service level. In terms of equipment, Thai and Filipino servicemembers prefer to import 
and use U.S. military equipment due to its higher quality and because it is more 
interoperable with their existing equipment.300 By contrast, they are generally dissatisfied 
with Chinese equipment. For example, when Thailand decided to purchase Song-class 
diesel submarines from China, the Thai Navy was reluctant to accept them due to concerns 
about the reliability of the Chinese vessels.301 When the Philippines accepted Chinese 
rifles, the AFP preferred not to accept them due to their poor quality and instead diverted 
them to the Philippine National Police (PNP).302  
There is a similar, ingrained preference for U.S. security cooperation when it comes 
to training. Thai and Filipino servicemembers consider U.S. training to be qualitatively 
superior to Chinese training.303 Exercises with China tend to be smaller, less complex, and 
much more limited in terms of interoperability due to issues like the language barrier and 
doctrinal differences. The English language and U.S. doctrine have been heavily 
institutionalized in the Thai and Philippine militaries; by contrast, China has not made 
meaningful inroads in encouraging these Southeast Asian partners to begin to learn 
Mandarin or to adopt Chinese doctrine as a basis for operations.304 Lastly, on an 
interpersonal level, the United States is far and away ahead of China in terms of personal 
relationships at the service level after years of the U.S. having been Thailand’s and the 
Philippines’ primary exercise partner and hosting Thai and Filipino officers for IMET-
funded training.305  
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These service level preferences are significant because they influence decisions at 
the political level. This dynamic is especially apparent in the Philippines. As indicated in 
sections 1 through 3 of this chapter, President Duterte has voiced a strong preference for 
decreasing security cooperation with the United States and increasing security cooperation 
with China, but his rhetoric has far outpaced the degree to which he has been able to 
implement this shift. One of the reasons for his slow progress is covered in section 4 and 
relates to Philippines’ territorial dispute with China. However, another significant 
limitation on President Duterte’s desired pivot to China has been the AFP. Many members 
of the AFP have spent their entire careers training and operating with the U.S. military, and 
they still consider the security relationship to be a crucial asset.306 Additionally, they 
continue to view China primarily as an adversary and thus have no appetite for Chinese 
military engagement.307 While President Duterte is ultimately in charge, the AFP have been 
able to exert significant influence to preserve their preferred relationship with the United 
States. For example, even after President Duterte publicly stated that he no longer wanted 
to import U.S. equipment, the AFP have largely continued to successfully justify and insist 
on continuing to make U.S. purchases.308  
D. CONCLUSION 
In sum, this chapter has demonstrated that there are multiple, interrelated factors at 
play that influence the degree to which Southeast Asian states seek, accept, or reject 
security cooperation with China. Specifically, the level of U.S. security engagement, the 
level of host nation interest in diversification, and the existence of illiberal political 
transitions, and the presence or absence of a major territorial dispute with China are all 
relevant factors that help to shape Thai and Philippine orientation towards China with 
regard to security cooperation. Both Thailand and the Philippines are similarly impacted 
by periods of U.S. withdrawal, shaken faith in the U.S. security commitment, and 
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heightened interest in diversification, brought on to some degree by U.S. reactions to 
military coups or human rights abuses in these countries. However, despite sharing these 
factors in common, Thailand has moved much further in its security relationship with 
China. It is assessed that this is due to the fact that the Philippines has a major territorial 
dispute with China, whereas Thailand does not. The presence of this dispute is significant 
enough that it is able temper the influence of other factors that could otherwise incline the 
Philippines closer towards China.  
The subsequent chapter will summarize these and other findings highlighted in this 
and preceding chapters of the thesis. It will also comment on the outlook regarding Sino-
Southeast Asian security cooperation moving forward, and it will offer some policy 




A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Chinese security cooperation in Southeast Asia has significantly increased since the 
turn of the 21st century. This increase has specifically been reflected in terms of more 
frequent port calls, bilateral exercises, multilateral exercises, and a growing volume of arms 
sales over the period from 2000 to 2017. The increase has also been reflected in terms of 
the number of Southeast Asian partners with which China has conducted some form of 
security cooperation over the course of the same period. This thesis has examined this trend 
of increasing Sino-Southeast Asian security cooperation from both the Chinese and 
Southeast Asian sides of the equation, identifying key motivations for China to expand its 
security relationships in the region and key factors influencing Southeast Asian states’ 
interest in seeking, accepting, or rejecting Chinese cooperation. 
From the Chinese side of the equation, this thesis has found that the Chinese 
motivation for amplifying its security cooperation activities in Southeast Asia is 
multifaceted. China’s primary motivation is to establish regional preeminence and cement 
its status as a great power. While security cooperation is not the only method by which 
China can achieve this end, it is a key tool in China’s toolkit. Other motivations 
contributing to this ultimate end that are also driving China to expand security cooperation 
in Southeast Asia include a desire to establish influence within key Southeast Asian states 
that can be wielded to serve Chinese interests, to prevent encirclement by the United States 
or its allies, and to assuage regional anxieties about perceived Chinese aggressiveness. 
On the Southeast Asian side of the equation, this thesis established a spectrum along 
which the wide degree of cooperation among Southeast Asian states with China could be 
demonstrated. Thailand and the Philippines stood out on this spectrum as countries whose 
security relationships with China, respectively, were among the most and least developed 
in Southeast Asia. When this thesis applied the hypothesis factors identified in Chapter I 
to these two selected case study countries, it found that each was relevant and had some 
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explanatory power in accounting for Thailand’s and the Philippines degree of security 
cooperation with China.  
However, the explanatory power of the hypotheses is not clear cut. As they operate 
in a simultaneous, and sometimes interactive, manner, it is not possible to assign a specific 
degree to which each hypothesis factor is functioning individually to determine the amount 
of security cooperation each Southeast Asian state conducts with China. For example, in 
Thailand, illiberal political transitions were largely responsible for prompting a decrease 
in U.S. security support. Concurrently, the reduction in support from the United States, and 
a consequent perception that the United States was less reliable as a security partner, played 
a role in causing Thailand to place a greater priority on diversification of its security 
partnerships. In this way, Hypotheses 1 through 3 had an interactive and compounding 
impact in influencing Thailand to conduct more security cooperation with China. 
Additionally, the absence of a major territorial dispute between Thailand and China, a 
factor represented in Hypothesis 4, has meant that there is not a significant barrier in place 
to temper this pro-cooperation influence. By contrast, for the Philippines, human rights 
abuses, in concert with decreased U.S. security support and a stated interest in greater 
diversification, interacted in a similar way as they did in Thailand to influence the country 
to take some limited steps towards greater security cooperation with China. However, the 
existence of a significant territorial dispute with China has been sufficient enough to temper 
the positive influence of the other factors, helping to explain why the Philippine security 
relationship with China is nascent in comparison with Thailand, despite the fact that the 
two countries bear many similarities with regard to the other hypothesis factors. 
B. OUTLOOK 
China’s security cooperation replacing or superseding U.S. security relationships 
in Southeast Asia is neither imminent nor inevitable. Even in countries where China has 
made the greatest effort, progress is still in development and remains somewhat limited 
overall, especially in comparison with the United States’ closest security relationships in 
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the region.309 Additionally, the United States maintains a comparative advantage in certain 
areas that will help to guard against rapid Chinese progress, particularly in countries like 
Thailand and the Philippines where the U.S. security relationship remains strong. In these 
countries, U.S. security cooperation is highly entrenched and institutionalized, and 
significant Chinese inroads in terms of replacing U.S. equipment with Chinese equipment, 
replacing English with Mandarin as a common second language among the military cadre, 
replacing U.S. doctrine with Chinese doctrine, and achieving interoperability would be 
very cost intensive and are unlikely in the near term.310  
There is more reason for concern, from the U.S. perspective, when one considers 
the long-term trajectory as opposed to the current reality of Chinese security relationships 
in Southeast Asia. U.S. security relationships in Southeast Asia remain strong; however, 
the United States should be wary of complacency.311 China has been strategic in seizing 
opportunities to increase security cooperation in Southeast Asia as they arise. Furthermore, 
once China does make inroads, it is difficult for the United States to gain that ground back, 
even if it steps up its own involvement in response. Additionally, once China has a 
foothold, it becomes easier for them to achieve additional progress, however incrementally. 
China is assisted by a number of other factors that do not work in the U.S. favor. 
The widespread perception of declining U.S. influence in Southeast Asia and the waning 
faith in the United States as a regional security provider is unlikely to abate in the near term 
due to the realities of the shrinking comparative advantage the United States has over China 
with regard to economic and military power. As indicated in Chapter IV, Southeast Asian 
states’ awareness of these realties can have a negative impact on the U.S. security 
relationship with certain states, creating an opening for China to pursue closer security 
cooperation. Additionally, for some Southeast Asian countries, the cost effectiveness of 
Chinese military equipment is a major draw with regard to procurements, even to the extent 
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that they are willing to compromise to some degree with regard to quality. It is not likely 
that the United States would be able to reduce the price of procurements sufficiently to 
compete with China on a cost basis. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
There are certain policies that the United States can implement in order to sustain 
its current security relationships in Southeast Asia and guard against Chinese usurpation: 
• The United States should capitalize on those areas identified herein that have 
proven to have a limiting effect on Chinese security inroads in Southeast Asia. 
The most prominent of these areas relates to territorial disputes. In the South 
China Sea, this will mean continuing to emphasize that Chinese behavior there 
is revisionist and resisting any regional tendency towards normalization of 
Chinese dominance over the territory. If Chinese behavior in the South China 
Sea were to become normalized over time, then the potency of this factor in 
limiting cooperation by countries such as the Philippines with China will likely 
wane. Additionally, there are opportunities for the United States to capitalize 
on the potency of territorial concerns even among Southeast Asian states that 
do not have a claim in the South China Sea. For example, the Mekong river 
region is an area of strategic importance for Thailand and an area where there 
is growing Thai concern about Chinese encroachment. The United States 
should increase its engagement with Thailand on the Mekong issue and seek 
ways in which to highlight unwanted Chinese activity in the area and assist 
Thailand in providing a desired counter-balance there.312  
• The United States should strive, to the greatest degree possible, to maintain 
consistency in its provision of security cooperation. As indicated herein, when 
the United States reduces security cooperation or is otherwise perceived to be 
unreliable as a security partner, Southeast Asian partners become more willing 
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to seek or accept security cooperation with China and thereby diversify sources 
of support in order to reduce dependence on the United States. Increased 
security cooperation and diversification of security partnerships could slowly 
erode the comparative advantage that the United States has with its closest 
partners in Southeast Asia, specifically with regard to the institutionalization of 
the U.S. security relationship based on the entrenchment of U.S. equipment, 
doctrine, and English language proficiency. Any degradation of this advantage 
will create opportunities for gaining ground that China will likely exploit.  
• Relatedly, the United States must reassure Southeast Asian security partners of 
its security commitment to the region. As indicated in herein, when Southeast 
Asian states’ faith in the U.S. security commitment wanes, there is a correlating 
willingness to consider warmer security relations with China. There are some 
concrete ways that the United States can achieve this end. For example, with 
regard to the Philippines, the United States can work with Philippine political 
and military counterparts to reduce the ambiguity in the MDT that has created 
a sense of doubt in the country about the reliability of the U.S. security 
commitment.  
• The United States should broach the topics of democratic principles and human 
rights with greater sensitivity and understanding. As indicated herein, when 
certain Southeast Asian partners receive U.S. criticism, or experience a 
curtailment of U.S. security support, as a result of a military coup or human 
rights abuses, this creates a justification for those partners to diversify sources 
of support away from the United States and towards China. Additionally, it can 
also create a sense of grievance that not only lingers and damages the country’s 
overall relationship with the United States but is also exploitable by China. This 
is not to say that the United States should change its stance on issues of 
democracy and human rights; rather, the United States should promote and 
adhere to these values in a manner more sensitive to the local context so that 
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their promotion does not come at the expense of the relationship.313 For 
example, the United States could strive to reduce the tenor of public criticism 
and resume the approach used prior to 2014 wherein sensitive policy related to 
democratic and human rights abuses was executed more quietly via diplomatic 
channels. 
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the Bilateral Relationship and Ways Forward, 36. 
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